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Abstract: The study searches for, and breaks open, paths to the philosophical 
understanding of human historicality which may reveal both the ontological-
historical identity and particularity of man, and the ontological origins of 
historiology, making them more comprehensible at the same time. The research 
reveals and articulates these divergent roots or origins in the finitude of human 
existence, or in the multiplicity of man’s all-time existential relation to it, in a 
critical dialogue with both tradition and contemporary philosophies of history. 
Within these, pre-eminently with the dialogues which scholarly research – albeit in a 
perhaps surprising way and horizon – undertakes nowadays with both Thomas 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, and Martin Heidegger’s pertaining thoughts. The summary of 
the meditations leads in fact to the recognition that: history exists because human 
death exists; or, more precisely, because there exists living being which relates to its 
death in its being, in and by its modes of being – explicitly or implicitly – in a 
being-like way. For which death, its own death is not a mere givenness but – by 
how it relates to it – a possibility in fact. And a possibility which, together with its 
all-time “substantive” occurrence, that is, dying – precisely by it yet always also 
above it! – originates as well as structures, articulates, permeates and colours all 
(other) being modes and possibilities of this living being’s being. That is, it opens 
them up, structures them open in reality, in, and precisely by, its finitude. By this, it 
also lends them an articulate gravity – open onto this finitude – constitutive of 
history. Thus, it articulates these modes of being truly as living history. 
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1
 The quotation marks around the expression “philosophy of history” are to highlight the 
fundamental situation that the subject of what follows here is not the “philosophy of history” 
in any kind of disciplinary sense – that is, as a particularly outlined and defined “branch” of 
philosophy or philosophical research – but precisely the nature of philosophical inquiry 
about history – together with its thematic peculiarities, outlines, weight and motivations – as 
outstandingly a mode of being, which existentially and ontologically pertains to the 
inquiring subject itself, to its being, with particular regard to the possibilities of this 
being. This is why I added the term ontology of history as clarification, without quotation 
marks. 




„..to seem to speak well of the gods to men 






For a start, some clarifying words must be said about the title of the study. First of 
all, about the word “and” which, as a conjunction, connects “death” and “history”. 
This “conjunction” here connects things which on the one hand are indeed and 
essentially interconnected – and as such, strive towards each other − but their 
interconnectedness, or the nature of their relationships, on the other hand, is for the 
time being very little known. Therefore the “and” in the title intends to be precisely 
the connecting and thematizing name of this question. The “and” is therefore a 
question which must first be explicitely and articulately: asked. And this means 
exactly that we must explicitly take it on ourselves, as inquirers, precisely in its 
pertinence to ourselves. In order for the “and” – in the thematic articulation and 
determinateness of death and history – to be able to reach its own nature as an 
element of connection, of bonding, to which then death and history pertain, and find 
each other through their pertinence to us. 
 However, “history” is allegedly primarily something which belongs to the 
past and which is dissected especially by historiology or the specialized branches of 
other disciplines. And indeed, when inquiring about something like “death and 
history”, the first obstacle to face would be precisely the historiological research of 
death and the results, data, problems revealed by it, as a relatively new development 
of historiology starting in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore the title could be 
understood in passing as if it were about some historiological “problematization” of 
death, and that it would be in fact (only) a summary of the data, theories, 
hypotheses, and difficulties formulated by it. However, such an inquiry would 
usually only remain at the superficial recognition that, similarly to all other “human 
things” – institutions, people, war, eating, clothing, art, sex, sciences, religion, 
technology, etc. – and also to all other things of “nature”, wildlife, universe, etc., 
death also “has” its history. As a result, it has, or must have, its historiology. Which 
will then hopefully reveal, sooner or later, and despite all difficulties, how we stand 
and have been standing with it.  
 Such a discipline of course meets all kinds of so-called epistemological 
problems all the time. That is to say, how something like “death” can be historically 
accessed, based on which sources or documents, or interpretation of these, etc.? 
Beyond this, the particularity of the historiological investigation of death is 
ultimately to figure out why we – living humans! – struggle with it? Why do we, 
living humans, strive to painstakingly answer the question, with laborious and 
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 Plato, Critias, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/critias.html, accessed 19. 01. 2012. 
methodologically complicated “scholarly” work, of how people who are no longer 
alive, who are now dead, once, in their “all-time” “humanity”, thought of, acted, or 
made arrangements about death or in issues regarding death? And why we strive, 
also, to find out reliably how they once died? 
Nonetheless, living humans are probably concerned also thematically with 
how the living once died because somehow they also know – or at least feel – 
themselves to be mortal. That is to say, death and dying is a “problem” or question 
for them which, although always pertaining to the future, is still very timely, being-
in-action, and very much alive; in other words, one that is precisely and certainly 
about to come. Therefore, since living humans are threatened by death and their 
own deaths in and from their own future at all times, or always in the present, this 
is probably why they turn, while alive, toward the research and understanding of 
past events related to death. This is in fact the case with any kind of historical 
research. The living actuality of the theme, the “problem” – that is: its question-like 
being-in-action – is what forms, creates and sustains the historical or 
historiographic interest in it, at all times, and in the very depth of things. Even if this 
actuality belongs in fact to the “history of effect”… 
In addition, it also becomes a question whether the historical research of 
death may have some kind of thematic as well as ontological and structural 
privilege over historicality, the essence of historicality itself? Which is only 
represented by the historiological research of death – or, more precisely, by the 
simple existence of such efforts – rather than thematized or articulated. It is clear 
now that our inquiry points to two directions. First, the direction of the historicality 
and historical problems of death, and second, the equally problematic direction of 
historicality itself.  
As mentioned before, historiology has started to study the problem of death 
only relatively recently, during the 1960s–1970s. These researches are connected 
primarily to the names of – mostly French3 – historians such as Philippe Ariès, 
Louis Vovelle, Vincent-Louis Thomas or Pierre Chaunu. As a result of these 
investigations, an increasing appetite for further research has been triggered – 
including historical anthropological and inter- and transdisciplinary inquiries – 
leading to a great deal of decisive information on death and the ways and social 
functions of how people related to death in various ages. Additionally, it has led also 
to information about the more essential aspect that death and the awareness of death 
proved by burials has played in human’s becoming human, that is, in the actual 
creation or coming into being of human history. (Pierre Chaunu for instance clearly 
claims: man only became (“completed”) man when somehow becoming aware of 
death, that is, a “mortal”.)4 
This way then the affair also gains – seemingly “by itself” – a dimension of 
philosophy of history. “Seemingly by itself” because in reality the historiographic 
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 Yet not exclusively the French historians of primarily the Annales school, since e.g. 
Elisabeth Kübler-Ross also conducted her research in the United States at largely the same 
time as Philippe Ariès, and published her book On Death and Dying in 1969.  
4
 See Pierre Chaunu, Trois millions d’annés, quatre-vingts milliards de destins (Paris: 
Éditions Robert Laffont, 1990), mainly the chapter “Religiosus et Moriturus”, 55–59. 
problematization of death – unspeakably and unthinkably – represents the most 
profound and radical challenge possible, mediating it (also) towards the philosophy 
of history. In other words, it does not only – “simply” or “complicatedly” – becomes 
the problem of how these ever more important “past” or “present” dimensions and 
aspects of death can be undertaken and outlined from a historical philosophical point 
of view, but also one that goes down to the foundations and origins of the 
philosophy of history and historiology itself. Together with the fact – and also in 
spite of it – that this case also offers the possibility of a re-encounter with two very 
distinct traditions represented by Thomas Hobbes on the one hand, and Martin 
Heidegger on the other. In his main work, Leviathan – as we shall see later on – 
Hobbes understood and explained the fear of death inseparably connected to self-
preservation as a fundamental “dynamizing” factor of human society and history, 
which had a very decisive role in the birth of events articulating historical processes 
(e.g. war and peace), institutions (the state, various corporations, the church, etc.), 
and of law and morality. As well as, also, in their actual, continuous, and 
continuously changing operation. Similarly, Heidegger writes it down without any 
further delay in Being and Time that: Authentic Being-towards-death – that is to 
say,  the finitude of temporality – is the hidden basis in Dasein’s historicality.5 
Of course, the historiological research of death also raises several essential 
problems both in subject and methodology. However, there are quite a few other 
questions that it raises or only “partly” answers. One of these half-raised questions 
is, as mentioned before, the following: Why does in fact historiology spend so 
much effort, especially recently, precisely on the research of the “past things” of 
death? That much is clear still, and it is also a subject of discussion, that death is an 
unavoidable “companion” of human life, and as such, it counts and proves as a 
“constant” of history.6 One that all humans who were ever born, all generations in 
history, or in fact making up history itself, have always had to face and continue to 
do so as their own death and dying. This implies, also necessarily, that the historical 
man – and what other kind of man is there? – faced and undertook, or avoided and 
denied, the various possibilities and problems of meeting death through highly 
varied and complex social, community and individual formations, constructions, 
notions, practices and experiences. In conclusion, the investigation of death means a 
particular challenge for historiology, as well as any other “discipline”. All the more 
so since such a historiological research is unavoidably articulated in the area of the 
fundamental awareness that “…if there existed no death, then probably there 
would be no society, nor history, nor future or hope…”!7 It is clear then – and as 
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 Martin Heidegger, Being and time, trans. John Macquerrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell Publishing, 1973), 438. (Emphasis added) 
6
 See Mihaela Grancea, Introducere (Introduction) In Reprezentări ale morţii în Transilvania 




 century), ed. 
Mihaela Grancea (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Casa Cărţii de Ştiinţă, 2005), 7. 
7
 See Marius Rotar, “Istoriografia românească asupra morţii: modele şi contra-modele. O 
lume încă deschisă” (Romanian historiography on death: patterns and counter-patterns. A 
world still open) In Idem. Reprezentări ale morţii în Transilvania secolelor XVI-XX, ed. 
Mihaela Grancea, 20. (Emphasis added) 
we have seen, for historiology too! – that the historical importance of death points 
well beyond its “merely” historiographic importance. Since, on the one hand, it is 
possibly precisely the historical meaning and importance of death which, at a 
deeper insight, lies at the basis of the interest of other disciplines – like 
anthropology, psychology, medicine, demography, sociology, “thanatology”, social 
services, etc. – in the subject of death.8 On the other hand, however, this meaning 
and importance actually and precisely points also to the direction of the origins and 
essence of historicality. And these are, probably, somehow – that is, existentially 
and ontologically – also connected to philosophical matters and cases of history, of 
the philosophy of history. In such a way that it raises the question whether the matter 
and case of the philosophy of history is indeed only a surfacing and 
“problematizing” of circumstances and aspects which would only serve to make 
more comprehensible and fluent the subjects and methodologies and historiology, or 
rather that of … “man” and being itself? In other words: is the philosophy of history 
not rather an ontology?  
In spite of this, and with reference to historiology, all this applies “only” to a 
thematically sharply outlined way of dealing with, and facing, death “as such”, 
which has its particular, historically articulated practices, institutions and habits. 
Such as, for example, the customs, ceremonies and institutions connected to dying, 
burial, or mourning. These are also quite varied and change according to different 
ages, peoples, communities, cultures, or organizations. As a result, although 
primarily encouraged by psychologists and psychological anthropology, historians 
increasingly speak now about the “system of death”, meaning by this the social, 
cultural, anthropological, mental-imaginary, as well as institutional and symbolic 
power structures, mechanisms and networks organized in the course of time around 
the human matters and questions of dying. As a result or connection, as also 
mentioned before, death also has its relevance of the philosophy of history. 
Primarily also thematically, that is, as something which articulates historicality, and 
particularly its thematically determined aspects. Even more importantly though, 
there is another aspect worth tackling for the exploration of the relevance of death 
for the philosophy of history, one in the sense of which death utterly lays the 
foundations of human history and historicality itself. (That is to say: it lays the 
foundations not only of “historiology” … although, at the depth of things, “human” 
historiology exists for the same reason as “human” history). For, if “laying the 
foundations” does not only mean for us some kind of a construct or operation – 
merely epistemological in nature or aspect –, but also the prerequisite of the logical 
principle of sufficient argumentation, then the foundation of history means none 
other in fact than saying why and whereby is there history at all?! And consequently 
or derivatively, historiology as well. It means therefore the exploration of that on the 
account of which, because of which, and for the reason (ratio) of which there exists 
at all such a thing as history.  
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 This is of course not only valid for the “scholarly” “problematization” of death – that is, 
one undertaken by sciences – but also for art, religion, folklore, mythology, social and 
economic life, and of course also philosophy.  
However, it is only one side and aspect of this that death – especially 
historically – pertains to life, to human life. And in such a way that it in fact 
illuminates life. As such, the historical “research” of death can also be counted as a 
promising “auxiliary subject” or “auxiliary instrument” of the historical “research” 
of life. As something that outlines historical life, and its truly – that is, mortally – 
living actuality. Moreover, in another respect, it should also be discussed that death 
does not only illuminate the historically articulated human life, so-to-say, 
“externally” – or more precisely, from its end, from an indefinite and aleatory 
“retrospective” point of view, as a foreign and external element – but it continuously 
interweaves and, what is more, grounds it in its most essential aspects. To such an 
extent that probably history exists precisely because there is mortal human life, that 
is to say, mortal human being who relates by his life to death, to his being-like 
death and mortality also in a being-like and mode-of-being-like way. In other 
words, because there is such a life to which death, its own death lends indeed, in all 
respects, weight, challenge, pressure – grip! – over itself and for itself, and by this a 
continuous and unavoidable possibility to undertake. So, the – non-human, non-
Dasein-like – life which is “finite”, and as such, it is always born, disappears, passes 
away, comes into being, extinguishes, changes and evolves… well, this life actually 
does not, and cannot have a history. Just as the “inorganic” regions of being has no 
history in fact, only in a metaphoric sense. Which of course does not mean that it is 
not in motion, in change, that it is unrelated with time, or it does not “possess” time, 
with all the processes and “events”, necessary or incidental, in the sense of their 
happening and references. These of course are also in touch with human history as 
challenges, meanings and possibilities, that is, when and if there is a questionable 
meaning or a question referring to meaning. So they have a story, but do not 
have a history. To such an extent that this story of beings devoid of history only 
becomes – or can only become! – a history of being by history.  
In accordance with this reasoning, history exists in fact because there is 
human death, because there are beings who relate – explicitly or implicitly – to 
death in and with their being, in and with their mode of being, in a being-like way. 
For whom death, their own death is not a mere givenness, but – by the way they 
relate to it – is in fact a possibility. Moreover, a possibility which, by its own 
“substantive” happening which is dying – precisely by it but always beyond it – 
derives and constitutes, as well as also structures, articulates, permeates and colours 
all of their other modes and possibilities of being. In other words, it opens them 
up truly and really, structures them open in, and precisely because of, its finitude. 
And by this, it also lends to these a well-defined importance, open towards, and 
from, this finitude, which also leads in fact to the articulation of these modes of 
being. If the various modes and regions of human existence as well as their birth and 
changes in time can prove that their very existence, meaning and change is utterly 
unthinkable and “absurd” without death, or that death plays a direct or indirect role 
in their coming into being or changes, then it is also proved that death grounds, 
originates and constitutes history in the above – that is: essential, ontological – 
sense.  
Relating to death (in a human, Dasein-like way) is always conditioned (and 
at the same time constituted) by freedom. Any being “devoid” of freedom – namely, 
one that does not relate to its own death –, although finite, does not die, “only” 
ceases to exist or gets extinct. So not only is it not free in its termination, neither is it 
in the “course” of its being. It is not at all so that “there is” freedom but it is 
“limited”, restricted – and ultimately restricted precisely “by death” –, but on the 
contrary, precisely because there is human death – that is, there is a being who in the 
course of his being necessarily relates to death, to his own death – there is also (at 
the same time) freedom, by it and with it. Therefore the – seemingly controversial – 
question must be whether death, understood and prevailing as a possibility, has a 
freedom-structure. Or, the other way round: is it not so that the existential-
ontological structure of death is actually and explicitly formed by the structure of 
freedom understood and prevailing as questioning, or rather as having an actual and 
explicit existential and ontological structure of question and questioning, and 
happening as such? At any rate, death as possibility, and being itself, relating to its 
death and meaningfully constituted and carried by it “contains” and at the same time 
constitutes freedom, and conversely, human freedom is made indeed human – that 
is, serious, delightful and dangerous, all at once – by death, mortality, the mortal 
nature of being. Just as, also conversely, it is also freedom which turns and shapes 
death into possibility, that is to say, makes it human! With the clarification that 
naturally neither death nor freedom are mere “concepts” but much rather 
“problems”, more precisely questions of being to be explicitly thematized. That is 
to say, factual questions opening onto one another, mobilizing and unfolding in a 
being-like way. Questions which, of course, have a fundamental importance for the 
philosophy of history as defined above.  
It is now quite clear in fact how restrictive it is to understand the expression 
“philosophy of history” as covering only “two different kinds of investigations” – 
“substantive” and analytical –, as done by Arthur C. Danto and his followers of the 
variably fashionable school of analytical philosophy.
9
 Danto stresses that the 
substantive philosophy of history is connected in fact to ordinary historical 
researches, trying to present something that happened in the past… The analytical 
philosophy of history is an “applied philosophy” for the particular conceptual 
problems raised partly by the practice of historical research, and partly by the 
substantive philosophy of history.
10
 However, at a deeper insight, it can be noticed at 
once that in both interpretations the “philosophy of history” unproblematically 
presupposes that, on the one hand, “there is” history, and on the other hand, “there 
is” also historiology. And also that the understanding of the relationship of the two 
lies in the clarification of some – basically and “merely” – “technical” problems of 
epistemological and conceptual nature. But first of all it presupposes that neither the 
being of history or historiology, nor their origins or roots form any kind of actual 
“problem”.  
In a strange, even astounding way, the situation is very similar with the 
approaches of the philosophy or philosophies of history which one might consider 
quite different from an analytical way of discussion. Karl Löwith in his rather 
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 See: Arthur C Danto, “Substantive and Analytical Philosophy of History,” In Idem, 
Narration and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
10
 Ibid. 
lightless book, after stating that the expression “philosophy of history” has become 
so diluted that slowly any kind of concept of history may unproblematically present 
or pretend itself to be a “philosophy of history”, gives a historical “definition” of the 
term according to which the “philosophy of history” expression signifies a 
systematic interpretation of history the principle of which makes a connection 
between historical events and their consequences and refers them to an ultimate 
meaning.
11
 Clearly, this purportedly very essential and therefore radical approach 
also starts from the assumption that, firstly, there is, there exists a history, 
secondly, that it consists of events and their consequences, thirdly, that it does so in 
a way that enables systematic interpretation, and fourthly, one that allows, or 
perhaps even requires that we refer the events and their consequences to some kind 
of ultimate meaning. An ultimate meaning which, in addition, is most times not 
even a part of “this” history, or rather it is beyond and leads beyond “this” history, 
even by the idea of “progress”. In this approach, utterly and inevitably, the 
philosophy of history is always struggling, captured by the patterns of the tradition 
of, primarily, (Christian or Jewish) theology (salvation history) and, secondly, albeit 
with few exceptions such as Nietzsche or Greek philosophy (the eternal return of the 
same). Therefore, irrespective of the fact that Löwith in his above mentioned 
investigations tries to prove precisely the untenability of such interpretations – 
namely, that there can be no sort of transcendent insight in history, that is, one 
leading beyond it, if starting from within history itself – he treats these patterns with 
a resigned acceptance of the inevitability, or so-to-say “absurdity” of things. As if 
there is or there can be no other possibility. Or, as if there is, or there can be no other 
possibility or condition for the philosophy of history to think about which, on the 
one hand, could go beyond these patterns, and on the other hand could thus also 
anticipate these. One which, moreover, focuses on and reveals aspects which, 
although hidden, are also functional or concealed in the patterns discussed above.  
Nonetheless, we can still rightfully ask – and do so indeed –, with respect to 
our intellectual roots, and their direct or twisted filiations towards the history of 
effect or otherwise: where does any kind of philosophy of history or any 
investigation, attitude and position about history come from and why is it the way it 
is…? Afterwards, depending on the origins and sources revealed and “identified” 
this way, we could perhaps also claim that no other kind of approach, different from 
those discussed above, is “truly” “possible”… Meanwhile, we have to keep in mind 
still that in the course of all this we are always and ever thinking about, or limit 
ourselves to, a kind of “beginning” and “end” of history. Even if we think about it in 
the cosmic dimensions of the Ancient Greeks, as an (eternal) return of one and the 
same thing.
12
 But meanwhile we have not thought at all about Why? – namely, 
                                                 
11
 See Karl Löwith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen: Die theologischen Voraussetzungen 
der Geschichtsphilosophie (Weimar:  Metzlersche J.B. Verlagsb, 2004).  
12
 Plato’s Timaeus most unequivocally illustrates this by the myth, the tale of the “creation” 
of man by the gods, man’s errand on various regions of Earth (e.g., Atlantis), and his 
perdition, etc. The return is thus “eternal”, but that what returns – that very same – must start 
over and over, eternally over and over… And must also come to an end! Or else it (the same) 
could not return again… So, in order to be able to say that the same piece of pottery may 
where and how does history come from?! For it could be the case – as it has been 
posed before – that history exists precisely because of, or as a result of, something 
that neither the ancient Greeks nor the theology of the Old Testament or Christianity 
has given any thought to… Either in an explicit, or in an actual way. 
 
2. Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle 
Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle have an outstanding 
importance from the point of view of the subject discussed in this study. For, 
although implicitly, these “interpretations” tackle and outline the very possibilities 
and conditions of thinking and existence – and they do so with a radical 
philosophical regard to their ontological and hermeneutical-historical situatedness – 
they are necessary in order to be able to avoid the previously presented patterns of 
the (philosophical) approach of history, proven to be insufficient, or what is more, a 
dead end.  
 In this case, philosophy is not a kind of “theory” which would then grasp 
something that is outside theory and entangle it in a conceptual-terminological net… 
nor is it something that differentiates in its origins from other “characteristics”, 
achievements or behaviours of man – let’s say, science or “practice” – but, to 
continue with a quotation, “philosophical research in its very actualization co-
temporalizes and thus brings to fruition the temporally particular concrete being of 
life in itself, and not first by way of some subsequent ’application’”13 Of course, in 
the “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle” – which expose for 
the first time the basic ideas of Being and Time – Heidegger speaks of the Dasein as 
“human”, but with the specification that “Factic Dasein always is what it is only as 
its own Dasein and never as the general Dasein of some universal humanity, whose 
cultivation would only be an exercise in futility. Critique of history is always only 
critique of the present.”14 In other words: this is also not about man as “human 
nature” in a “general sense”, a humanity abstract and invariable throughout history, 
but one which becomes temporal above all as Dasein, and being-here, and, 
moreover, as factic. As a historical critique of the present! However, Heidegger’s 
subsequent words must also be added to this: critique cannot naively think that it can 
hold history responsible for what it should have done if… And this again does 
probably not mean the triviality which is usually formulated like this: “there is no 
“If?!” in history, for the past is something that has already happened, was already 
decided and ended.”… Indeed, on the basis of such a public opinion no kind of 
                                                                                                                              
break again sometime in the future, that piece of pottery must be made again, it must be 
created again in the same way… And the breaking of the pot will always mean its end in the 
same way. But since such a beginning and such an end can never coincide in the eternal – or 
actually not eternal, only permanent – return of the same thing, this return cannot possibly 
ignore, nor eliminate these.  
13
 Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: 
Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation,” In Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His 
Early Occasional Writings 1910–1927, ed. Theodore J. Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 158. 
14
 Ibid., 157. 
historical critique is possible. All this is about the fact that critique “... must focus on 
the present and see to it that it asks questions in a manner which is in accord with 
the originality within its own reach.”15 That is to say, historical orientation itself, 
actually and primarily, derives from an orientation to the present – that is, a living 
one! – but without its being exhausted in the present. On the contrary: in a more 
fundamental aspect and sense, in the present history is always “present”, it is here – 
firstly as past and tradition, but also as future – as something problematic and 
questionable. “Here” as well as “there”. As something, that is, which we cannot just 
simply accept and take over, nor just continue… and therefore we must always, 
“inevitably”, also negate it! But: “History is negated not because it is ’false’ but 
because it still remains effective in the present and nevertheless can never become a 
properly appropriated present.”16 To put it differently: on the one hand, history as 
past always articulates the present and interferes with it, while, on the other hand, 
this always happens in such a way that it can never offer sufficient, readymade and 
thematic answers to questions comprising problems, restrictions and anxieties that 
we (living) humans face in a determined and particular way in the constraints and 
possibilities of our all-time present. History and tradition appearing as the past is on 
the one hand inevitable, and on the other hand it is always an “object” of – 
appropriated – critique. However, this is not some kind of methodological rule or 
etiquette of general validity but: “The fixing of the basic historical bearing of 
interpretation grows out of the explication of the sense of philosophical research.”17 
The “sense” of philosophical research and the focussed horizon of this sense means, 
outlines and inquires primarily whether its “object” is the factic human Dasein as 
such, or whether philosophical research itself is a definite mode of factic life, and as 
such, by its own occurrence it renders simultaneous within itself, and not merely a 
subsequent “application”, the all-time concrete being of life. 
 Now: the expression “factic human Dasein” signifies first of all a kind of 
liveliness, or even liveliness itself. That is why, in connection with the “factic 
human Dasein” Heidegger speaks directly about “factic human life”. Because, no 
matter how manifold the meaning of the term “life”, it refers first of all to liveliness. 
However, from the point of view of the understanding of life and the liveliness of 
life the issue of death has an outstanding importance. In the first place, because 
death “threatens” precisely life and its liveliness as such, and, what is more, in an 
unavoidable way. Death is thus not simply or “formally” “beyond” life, but it is 
directly the how of life: the factic human Dasein, the factic human life exists 
factically always and ever in such a way that it (will) die, that is, it is mortal. This 
way, for a factic human life death is never merely a simple event or “process” of the 
termination of human life, but – although undeniably together with it – death is 
much rather something towards which life factically approaches, and before which 
life stands as before something inevitable. For this reason life cannot actually be 
grasped without the explicit thematization of death, saying that since death is the 
“opposite” of life, it does not belong to life, resulting that the grasping of life “in 
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itself” could be done without death. In contrast, Heidegger emphasizes that the 
problem of the possession of death must be treated by the investigation of the 
objectual and existential character of factic life as having a problem-guiding 
importance. Therefore the theme of death has indeed an outstanding ontological, 
phenomenological and hermeneutical – and consequently: historical – importance 
for the thematization of life, of factic human Dasein. This importance however is 
not built upon externally understood considerations or expectations – usually called 
“methodological” or “theoretical” – but it has itself an altogether ontological and 
existential-historical nature. In which, however, it is primarily the “inevitable”, 
“certain” character of death which must be set down, interpreted and undertaken. 
For the fear of thinking, of undertaking the matters (Sache) of thinking, their 
avoidance and escape is nothing else in fact than “life’s avoidance of itself”.  
 “Inevitable” and “certain” death stands therefore before life, before the 
living, that is, before ourselves! This also means that factic life, factically too, 
always approaches death in some way. So, death exists in the same way as life 
does, with death standing in front of it as something that it approaches with 
certainty and stubborn inevitability! Evidently, this way death becomes the how 
of life, if in no other way than as some kind of “how” of the possession of death. 
Therefore death, without losing anything of its certainty and inevitability, does not 
mean in fact any kind of loss of perspective, a mere passage or a simple or formal 
termination of life, but, on the contrary, it can directly “give vision to life”. And in 
such a way that, as something that stands before or is at hand, only death can lead 
life to its most actual and particular present and past. For the factic human Dasein 
and its understanding or interpretation the “approach to death” is not merely a kind 
of “natural process”, with its time-direction “characterized” by the unstoppable 
growth of the past at the expense of the future, but on the contrary, it is rather the 
unavoidable and certain – constitutive – futurity of death which, as the “how” of life, 
constitutes the temporality – that is: historicality – of factic life. For, with its future 
standing-before, death makes visible for factic human Dasein both its present and 
past.  
 Heidegger offers and outlines thus an equally ontological, existential, 
phenomenological and hermeneutical – and therefore essentially historical – analysis 
of death. And what is more, precisely as something that is fixed and outlined as an 
aspect which guides problem management. So the issue here is not merely how 
people “processed” in time their own mortality and death as “conscious knowledge” 
or “ideas”, and this is also not relevant in fact; the issue is that the mere 
understanding of these historical-anthropological aspects, knowledge and ideas is 
only possible by the historical and actual, but nevertheless essentially ontological 
exhibition and explicitation of the existential phenomenon of death. For people most 
times “consciously” avoid the actual possession of death… But of course they are 
still not able to avoid or escape, nor transgress death, and thus it remains, in spite of 
all, an existential-historical constituent that ontologically articulates their factic 
Dasein. For this reason Heidegger has to unambiguously settle the matter that: “The 
purely constitutive ontological problematic of the character of the being of death 
which is described here has nothing to do with a metaphysics of immortality and a 
metaphysics of the ’What next?’ or ’What comes after death?’”18 For both of 
these – the metaphysics of immortality and the metaphysical inquiry about the 
“events” after death – are nothing else in fact than attempts for “escape”. What is 
more, the idea of immortality and the metaphysics of the inquiry about the 
“something” after death makes nothing less in fact than being an unredeemable 
failure
19
 regarding the actual object or matter of philosophical research! 
Additionally, Heidegger also says: “The basic sense of historical is defined in terms 
of this temporality...”20 This means that the fundamental meaning of the historical is 
defined on the basis of none other than that what stands before us – namely, 
precisely death! –, moreover, from its factic possession, that is, rendered 
simultaneous by its present problematic character… and not on the basis of some 
kind of “historical past” grasped and recorded by “historiographical notions”. 
Simply, man is not “historical” because it has a “historical past”, which is then 
revealed by a very much historical “historiology”, but because he his temporal in 
such a way that in his being and through his being, and in a constitutive way, he 
always renders his future, present and past factically as temporally simultaneous as 
here, always actually and “spatially” articulated. That is, first of all, in fact by the 
having/possession of death. So the basic human ambition for the persistence of 
human endeavours and actions, as well as the desires and thoughts of immortality 
are born precisely from the nature of the awareness of death, and the problematic 
character of immortality. Whoever does not think that he will die – that is, whoever 
has indeed no doubts that despite his “death” he will somehow not die still – would 
not and could not in fact build pyramids, mausoleums, scientific truths, works of art, 
technical innovations or institutions for endurance. Therefore the philosophy which 
explicitly and decidedly concentrates on this issue cannot remain some kind of fine 
yet indifferent “theory”, but only a dedicated research happening in the form of 
questioning search which, unambiguously and clearly, “has decided radically and 
clearly on its own (without distractions of any busywork with worldviews) to make 
factic life speak for itself on the basis of its very own factic possibilities; i.e. if 
philosophy is fundamentally atheistic and understands this about itself – then it has 
decisively chosen factic life in its facticity and has made this facticity into its very 
own comprehensive object and subject matter.”21 
 Nevertheless, Heidegger marks the entanglement of the decisive forces with 
effect on the existential character of the “present” situation as “in short the Greek-
Christian interpretation of life”.22 The most important thing about it is not to 
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reveal the various currents and their interdependence either in the sense of literary 
affiliations or as “images”, but to emphasize the central ontological, logical and 
historical structures by an authentic treatment of the sources. However, this is only 
possible from the direction of the “facticity problem”, which primarily means again 
that we must proceed “from the present going back to the past”. But Heidegger 
marked this “Greek-Christian interpretation of life” in such a basic sense as a 
constitutive force having effect on the existential character of the present situation 
with the inclusion of anti-Greek and anti-Christian tendencies as well. For, as he 
says, this is what defines them also… Clearly, we cannot deal here with aspects 
such as those of the history of philosophy, theology or especially anthropology. It 
must be noted nonetheless that Heidegger calls for this historical retrospection and 
“search for origin” from the “central foundation of facticity”. Whereas the radical 
range of this foundation is best illustrated by the fact that – at a deeper thought – this 
Greek-Christian interpretation and tradition of life, and the history that it outlines, 
lacks precisely the certainty of the possession of death, and particularly its 
constitutive-factic-historical projection on existence! Both in the Greek-Christian 
teaching of the immortality of the soul and the early Christian awaiting of the 
Apocalypse affecting “humanity” as such, etc. However, this is indeed an essential 
and fundamental aspect for Heidegger… 
 As a kind of closure for the commentaries and notes on the 
Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle, it should also be 
mentioned that, although Heidegger pointed out that the present, the current age is 
determined by “standing in the Greek-Christian interpretation of being”, these 
interpretations – from the perspective of the facticity problem – do not deal at all 
with the Christian interpretation of being… A few lines in the mostly only 
enumerative discussion – and also one that leads back to Aristotelian origins on the 
paths of destruction – of the major crossing points of historical theological-
philosophical affiliations are the only hints to the fact that these multiplied 
connections and transfers would go back to the early Christian religious life 
experience. However, the hermeneutical and phenomenological tackling of the 
latter, with special regard – as I have said – to the facticity problem, as well as to its 
historical critique previously stated as compulsory, is in fact completely absent and 
only signalled as a task. And, what is more, without raising, for instance, the 
problem of the particular historical difficulties of this task. It is understandable 
therefore that Heidegger himself – in contrast with many of his commentators – 
ventures into no detailed speculations on this field…23 However, it is clear still that 
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 As regards the question – historically and existentially highly problematic and diversified 
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Christian theology described as moving away from the religious life experience of 
early Christianity and the philosophy influenced by this Christian theology speak 
about their particular domains and experiences of being in a language of categories 
which are not only “borrowed” but completely different – not to say alien – from 
these domains and experiences precisely because they employ the conceptual 
instruments of the Greek, and primarily Aristotelian experiences regarded as 
summarizing for tackling their own experiences. No matter how much this language 
became widespread and dominant in the course of time and transfers – 
interpretations, selections and misinterpretations. At any rate, the radical 
interpretation and preservation of the factically authentic experiential possibilities of 
present generation(s) presupposes the radical re-thinking of language, the language 
of categories, with regard their original meaning. However, its source and 
orientation as well must be again the problematic and tensed intimacy of facticity in 
order for philosophy to be able to recognize itself anew and its present possibilities, 
as well as its own history, as a particular way of factic life. For factic life is from the 
beginning a life in the world, which is historical and therefore understands itself in a 
historical way. So philosophy must also “go together with life” (Mittgehen mit dem 
Leben). Philosophy is of course primarily a “historical” cognition in the sense of its 
destructively confronting its own history.  
 However, such a “confrontation” must sooner or later also reveal that – as 
pointed out before – this (“private”) history utterly lacks precisely the certainty of 
the possession of death, decisive and dominant with regard to the handling of 
the problem itself! In parallel with the insight into this problem, it is inevitable to 
admit that this way, in this facticity, such a history is constituted and happens in 
fact in a way in which (at least one of) the basic “functions” of the so-called culture, 
“with respect to the ‘handling’ of the problem of death”, has always been and 
continues to be exactly the avoidance and negation of death as actual dying. 
Heidegger might be right (also) about this to emphasize as a decisive aspect with 
respect to the existential character of the present situation that it “stands” in the 
history of being outlined and articulated in and by the “Greek-Christian” 
interpretation of being. In such a history of being that negates and takes pains – or 
struggles – to deny and relegate the acceptance of precisely that something which it 
should thank for its very existence, the particularities of its existence and its most 
characteristic modes of being – science, art, technology, religion, morals, law and 
institutions, communities, individuals etc. – as well as the multicoloured formations 
of their historical unfolding! However, the denial of death as dying, and this kind of 
escape and turning away from death does not “eliminate” history… as neither does it 
eliminate the fact that, in spite of this, it essentially derives from human death. On 
the contrary, it gives a particular articulation for this history as well as the history of 
being unfolding by it. With respect to its possibilities and the limits of these.  
                                                                                                                              
On the contrary! On this account the Christian church only defined the nature of the relations 




 century, namely in Saint 
Augustine’s treatise entitled De cura pro mortuis gerenda, written around 421–422, see 
Jacques Le Goff and Jean-Claude Schmitt, Dictionnaire raisonné de l’Occident Médiéval 
(Paris: Fayard, 1999).  
 Undoubtedly again, the Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to 
Aristotle firstly reveal and validate the aspect that “historical” orientation derives in 
fact from an (always questionable and “problematic”) orientation to the present; 
secondly, they grasp and outline it as a thematic, present-day – but always 
temporally simultaneous – explicitation; and thirdly, they place all this in the 
historical horizons of a Greek-Christian – or more correctly originally Greek and 
then gradually, yet not unproblematically Christian – life interpretation effective 
until today. By these three aspects, the Phenomenological Interpretations – in their 
own words – also “over-enlighten” these, and thus they, even if not directly acquire, 
make possible nonetheless such a fundamental and radical insight and acceptance 
regarding history with the help of which then the seemingly inevitable stereotypes of 
the “philosophy of history” that K. Löwith spoke about may become transcendable 
indeed, existentially and ontologically alike. For Heidegger’s actual – temporally 
simultaneous – focal point24 targeting the present is, on the one hand, the unfolding 
of the facticity problem, and on the other hand, the explicit thematization of death. 
From the point of view of their interdependence however, all these actually always 
prove to be the different faces of one and the same circle of questions and inquiry. 
This way thus it is indeed the constitutive future of death (related to the present) 
which shifts the present in the horizons of its own possibilities in the – also 




It can be repeated therefore, now on the basis of different insights and 
considerations, that history “simply” and actually exists because there are, there 
exist living mortal beings who relate to their own mortality in a factic, being-like 
way. Whose entire “characteristic” and particular modes of being are not only 
“surrounded”, pervaded, impregnated and intertwined, but also directly constituted 
and – albeit mostly covertly – structured and articulated by this explicitly thematic, 
although often non-thematic relation. Now, the ancient Greek, Jewish and Christian 
culture hardly thematizes explicitly, and, what is more, directly negates and denies 
death as dying.
25
 While, “of course”, this “creates”, produces, “operates”, and 
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 For a direct and objective orientation, some aspects are worth being repeated. 
Psychologists, anthropologists etc. experience and understand the denial of death as a kind 
of “basic human necessity”, as a defence against the oppressiveness of – especially the 
salience of – death and the anxiety it causes, as something by which people try to handle, 
“manage” the terror of the threat of death. That is to say, the terror of that which they face by 
their experiences, and not just in a “general” sense, but with precise reference to themselves. 
This may then trigger and keep up several – immediately or distantly effective – defence 
makes always actually “possible” precisely such a kind of history, constituted and 
organized by a turning-away and denying type of “possession of death” and relation 
to death. One which, ever since these beginnings, increasingly becomes its own 
“fate”, gazing at its end, and decisively outlined by its concern with its end. This is 
what determines in fact the relation of “death” and “history”, as well as how all this 
has a relevance for the philosophy of history, of course not only in a thematic 
respect. Since this results in a different kind of insight, in addition to, and beyond 
the currently fashionable problematic and problem management, into what the 
primary or actual interest of the philosophy of history is and how it is shaped. For it 
ever more clearly outlines that the posing of the explicit question of death with 
regard to the present, as well as the historical research and meditation deriving from 
it while bringing the future into play does not, and cannot mean only to discover or 
observe current methods or ideas about death and then, in contrast with 
investigations of the ubi sunt? type, we complete the so-called “critique” of the past 
starting from, and on the basis of, these. On the contrary, it can only mean that we 
explicitly bring into action those questions which, albeit related to the experiences of 
the present and cannot be imagined without these, are nevertheless not asked by the 
present throughout its experiences! Still, these are precisely the kinds of questions 
which can ensure actual historical orientation only if they are explicitly asked.  
 However, this “historical orientation” only partly means the discussion of 
past aspects about the subject. Rather, it is something by which the present may also 
gain its real historical dimension. For it is revealed that human death is probably 
primarily about the constitution of history and historicality, and not about the things 
we might find out from evidence and interpretations on how people used to die or 
                                                                                                                              
mechanisms. One of the most important such defence mechanisms denying death is the 
primordial faith and thought, or rather idea of immortality, which, in the meantime, always 
faces actual, factic death, dying… This is how death becomes something which, while being 
a loss of life, is not dying… and dying becomes something which now terrorizes and 
horrifies indeed as something impossible to be understood, “handled” or “managed”. 
Therefore it must be denied over and over, again and again, as a cultural etc. heritage from 
generation to generation! Except that it is not only death which loses its weight in a denied 
death, but life itself as well. For life becomes something the loss of which – with 
Kierkagaard’s unambiguous words – is not deadly! Or, as Nietzsche said in a different 
respect: man has lost in his life much more important things than his life… Of course, the 
indeed much more “uncomfortable” question must also be occasionally inevitably asked 
whether facing death is not just as an existential-ontological-historical “basic necessity” and 
basic interest of man than its denial? A basic necessity which is always – historically! – 
oppressed and overwhelmed by the historical denial of death which specifically articulates 
even history itself?! This eminently philosophical problem must be raised and maintained 
despite the fact that, so it seems, the “denial of death” has already triggered dynamic and 
extensive – anthropological, psychological, sociological, historical, etc. – research also 
thematically, initiated and fertilized ever since by Ernest Becker’s – suspiciously successful 
– book from 1973, The Denial of Death. See also: Daniel Liechty, “Reaction to mortality: an 
interdisciplinary organizing principle for the human sciences,” Zygon 1 (1998): 45–58; 
Camilla Zimmermann and Gary Rodin, “The denial of death thesis: sociological critique and 
implications for palliative care,” Palliative Medicine 18 (2004): 121–128; Joseph Bottum, 
“Death & Politics,” First Things June/July (2007): 17–29. 
think, relate or behave about death – perhaps even in a way not uninteresting for the 
future. Nevertheless, and seemingly above all this, “historicality” marks first how 
man exists in time, and second, how he treats time meanwhile. This has lately been 
expressed by the formulation of François Hartog, the “regimes of historicality”, 
which was originally understood in two ways only. In a somewhat restrictive sense it 
asked how society treats its past and what it “says” about it. In a wider sense 
however the term was meant to designate the “modes of the consciousness of human 
community”.26 Later, it was also associated with the difficult task for the term to 
describe the various modes of being in time.
27
 Therefore the “regime of 
historicality” is clarified on the one hand by the expression “time regime”, which is 
very important, on the other hand, because historians as a rule do not think about 
time. Because they tend to consider it “unambiguous/implicit”. And amidst this 
“lack of ambiguity” outlines also the possibility and probability that this 
omnipresent present may begin at once to look most unambiguous. This is primarily 
what Hartog calles “presentism”. However, Hartog also rather only assumes that 
time exists! and also that history exists! and urges to examine – no, not how they are 
possible, but – how they are articulated or interconnected “meanwhile”. Moreover, it 
urges to explore how, also “meanwhile”, these connections – coloured at the 
beginning and end by the “crises of time” – outline the older regimes of historicality, 
or the ever newer ones just separating from these. 
 These issues have to be raised here in order to clarify that the problematic of 
“death and history” also inquires wherefrom and how time comes – namely that 
which, as admitted by Hartog, historians do not usually think about –, and (also) 
wherefrom and how history comes to being through this at the same time. For it 
could well be that time and history actually come to being and step into being “from 
the same place”… This of course does by far not mean that historicality and the 
related “temporality” has no, or could have no “regimes”. However, the question is 
whether a different kind of historical research, “historical orientation”– as we have 
called it above in relation to Heidegger – regarding so-called “presentism” is 
possible and meaningful at all? And if it is, then in what way? Is it not perhaps the 
case that – although in an implicit, unexpressed and unacknowledged way, but – 
with regard to its original or actual intentionality, all such kind of historical 
investigation derives in fact from the present questionableness and 
problematicness of the subject of this research? Even if the thematic ramifications of 
actual historical research – like in most of the “concrete” cases – always direct, in 
relation with their own needs, also on a disciplinary level, by their particular 
transmission (as well), the continuously redefined intentions unfolding towards the 
past of the present research. We are not speaking therefore about any kind of 
“stance” of the present, from where we humbly or complacently, yet decidedly 
investigate our past, burdened with all kinds of methodological problems and at the 
expense of various ordeals and efforts. Much rather, it is the question-points of the 
present (pertaining and supporting, as well as deriving from the future) which direct 
                                                 
26
 See François Hartog, Régimes d’historicité. Présentisme et expérience du temps 
http://osp.revues.org/index752.html, accessed 24. 01.2012. 
27
 Ibid. 
such investigations, as well as the questions which move them, to the landscape of 
an always historically articulated past, actually – that is: in actus – corresponding to 
these.  
 In spite of, or together with this, there is still general consent about the fact 
that historiology investigates and researches nothing else but the Past. In addition, 
there is also general consent about the fact that “historicality” is not merely a 
“particularity” or “characteristic” of the past, but of the present and future as well. 
Notwithstanding all this, the terms “present” and “future” from the perspective of 
historiological research should not be understood as “dimensions of time” which 
characterize, accompany, and constitute “all” events, processes, changes, etc., but 
much rather as entities which are not “subjects” and themes of historiology. But 
which are nevertheless somehow entitled to the attribute of “historicality”. But how, 
on what grounds can the present and future be entitled to the attribute of 
“historicality” when the science of history – and every kind of historical interest of 
its inspiration (histories of philosophy, literature, science, etc.) – “only” and 
exclusively research the past?  
It is clear therefore that this question dwells in fact on the privilege that historiology 
enjoyed in exhibiting and articulating historicality. Not meaning, however, that this 
questioning could only be listed as a kind of “epistemological” problem of 
historiology. Since, indeed, in the cognition of historicality itself, the past somehow 
still seems to be a privileged dimension (of time). Because “within that”, at least in 
theory, we may see the events in their – actual, alleged or apparent – finiteness. That 
is, precisely in that privileged – or seemingly privileged – sense in which these 
events perhaps no longer happen… for they have “passed”! In the dimension, the 
ecstasy of the past, therefore – at least seemingly – the events or happenings can be 
seen and analyzed together with their preliminaries, their course, and above all this, 
also with most of their consequences. In contrast, for instance, with the problems of 
the present which have their “preliminaries” as well, and they are happening just 
now, and will also probably have their consequences, but these – especially the latter 
ones – cannot or can hardly be seen as explicit or articulated. Because they do not 
exist as yet.
28
 Well, it is surely this actual, or “real” situatedness which creates the 
circumstance or the appearance that the privileged place and dimension of the 
insight in, and tracing of historicality is indeed the past and the science which 
investigates it – namely, historiology. 
 Nevertheless, led by these appearances, we tend to forget that all the 
dimensions or ecstasies of historicality that offer us insights into the past during its 
(historiological) investigation are actually and essentially nothing else but only and 
exclusively appearances. Since everything that we come across this way in relation 
with temporality and the adjoining historicality is actually only HAD-BEEN-NESS. 
That is to say, the past is in the past, the present is in the past, and the future is also 
actually only in the past… So, in a strict sense, all these cannot be actual either, 
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since they cannot be presents which are actually present and here, nor futures which 
are actually about to come. So there can be no PAST either! In addition to this, the 
particular situation about the past always is that it – when it was present – never was 
our present, but as a past it nevertheless and necessarily somehow “turns into” our 
past. This means of course that in order to indeed gain insight into, or read 
something like “historicality” or its articulation from the research of past things… 
well, for this we should also previously possess an essential insight referring to, and 
at the same time also questioning temporality and, in connection with it, 
historicality. Without which we would probably not investigate the “past” at all. 
However, this preliminary insight is precisely historical to the highest possible 
degree! And as such, on the one hand it also takes part in the shaping of history, and 
on the other hand, it is constantly changing, that is, it is always different. Therefore 
one must also go “behind” it in a philosophy of history perspective, for it should also 
be found out where it actually comes from or derives. 
 However, if it can be proved that time, the actual, that is, finite time as well 
as “all” our factic and being-like “relations” to it, to the past, the present, and the 
future, derive in fact, ontologically and existentially, from human death, which is 
human mortality in all its aspects, then it can also be essentially proved that history 
and historicality also derive and originate from the same thing, namely from death, 
from the mortally living, continuous being-like relation, constitutive of being, to 
our own death, our mortality, a relation not only of continuity but also of repeated 
unavoidable emergence with particular reference to every single generation! Quite 
regardless therefore of the aspects or questions – or rather: anticipating these at least 
in regard to essentiality – of what the “building stone” of history is, or what counts 
as the “essence” of “historiology” from the point of view of historiological – or 
intellectual history (Geistgeschichte) – scholarship, or from that of different 
philosophies of history connected to these in various ways. Perhaps the actions of 
great historical personalities, the anonymous actions of the masses, or rather the 
event (Hayden White), the change (Arthur C. Danto), large timeframes (Fernand 
Braudel), the narrative (Paul Ricoeur), or the various structure of the different 
discourses making up the narratives, etc. Or perhaps the fact whether or not history 
has its general laws (Aristotle, Schopenhauer, Hempel), or whether or not there is 
“universal history”, or what/who the “subject of history” is (Hegel, Georg Lukács), 
etc. … Quite the opposite, it is not at all incidental that the great historians and 
philosophers of history of the 19
th
 century (Michelet, Droysen, Ranke, Dilthey, etc.) 
emphasized, unanimously in fact, as Droysen formulated it, that history is the 
shaping of human things and that these belong to the scope of historical research 
precisely because human things are historical.  
 But what do “human things” mean and how is this connected to the fact that 
these “things” are – as if from the outset – “historical”? But what else can it mean 
that some things are “human things” if not that these are the matters and things of a 
being living in time as a mortal being? And indeed, “matters” and “things” whose 
beings as “matters” and “things”, primarily and directly, are particularized and 
emphasized by their – being- and mode of being-like – pertinence to this being. As a 
permanently reborn and outlined challenge, givenness, possibility or task. For what 
else does it mean to be a “mortal” than to be and live finitely, in need and 
satisfaction, in challenge or threat, or in possibilities? The case is therefore that 
“human things” – and by this, the ontological identity of man, and consequently also 
man’s so-called “specificity of being” – is particularly rooted in, originating from, 
and focussed by mortality, that is, human finiteness. Therefore this aspect and the 
possession of this aspect, a possession attained and accomplished over and again, 
should/must guide the handling of the problem itself.  
 
3. Leviathan and the “human things” 
“Human things” are finite. And they are finite in a human way. That is to say, they 
are “imperfect” because they are mortal. And thus: alive! As such, they “belong to 
nature” on the one hand, while on the other, so it happens, they also have their own 
particular “nature”. One that differs and is beyond their “physical” nature. This is 
what thinkers – and not only them – have called “human nature” for so long. No 
matter how “human” it is, “human nature” is also nature. And as such, it is moving, 
dynamic.  
 In Thomas Hobbes’s view the dynamics of physical nature is the dynamics 
of moving matter. Then the dynamics of human nature is precisely the movement 
which may rightly be called history. At its basics, this history begins with the 
“natural state” of man, this is from where it begins and comes into being, and this is 
also to which it always relates and is compared. Precisely through “human nature” 
and its constituents. Which are “comprised” of human needs and the desires and 
wishes unquenchably and increasingly connected to them. While “happiness” is 
nothing else than the permanent and repeated or expected satisfaction of these 
desires and wishes. To give up the efforts and competition for this therefore actually 
means to die. However this also ensures two things, two directions for insight. First, 
that the man who stops his efforts or endeavours to satisfy his needs and desires will 
die – that is, death directly awaits and threatens him because of this – and second, 
that a dead man will no longer have such needs or desires urging him for actual 
dynamics. Again by his nature, man is also characterized by the ability to speak. The 
ability, that is, to form signs first, then language in relation to his experiences. With 
help of which he will then always currently interpret (present) his experiences or 
desires (future), sharing them with others and referring them to others, and also 
always recalling (past) his memories about them. Man therefore, with its own human 
nature, belongs to nature while raising above it in such a way that it steps into being 
as a central and essential shaper – yet of course not necessarily omnipotent lord – of 
its own universe, conditioned by his own nature. That is: he builds! He builds, 
shapes the possibilities and conditions of his being, his life connected to the always 
timely and dynamic necessities outlined in the shadow and impulses of the manifold 
and pluridirectional perspectives and threats of death. The threat of death is 
therefore a task and circumstance which is always present and but should always be 
fended off. And which, therefore, must always take place most organically and 
intimately in the motivation, drawing-up and articulation of the temporal existence 
and actions of man. As well as, of course, also for their actual and “practical” 
interpretation. No matter how problematic Hobbes’s idea of the non-natural 
conditions of man and the ensuing new political, legal or moral society may be 
historically – or rather from the point of view of historiological confirmation –, he 
still offered a completely new perspective of the philosophy of history with his 
insights. A perspective in which the fundamental question is by far not merely “How 
events and actions have occurred?” but much rather why and wherefrom history is, 
what it is, where it comes from and how it actually works?! 
 It is only possible in fact on the basis of such an inquiry to discuss, say, the 
issues of political institutions, etc., that is, the “human things” pertaining to these. 
For the establishment and permanent operation of even the state and all the 
connected political and legal bodies is dependent on the life of people and 
communities – mainly and ultimately articulated by the threat of death and its 
various possibilities – and the quality and well-being inseparably linked to them. 
And the opposite is also true! That is to say, the preservation of human life, also 
against the constant possible threat of death inseparable from human life – including 
its possible well-being as well – precisely to this end and reason, as human creation, 
is only possible by and with the help of the state founded on contractual and 
agreement grounds and a political, legal etc. body. First and foremost then, this is 
precisely what must be admitted and accepted about these formations, together with 
their historical, social, political, legal, or organizational changes in time. 
Consequently: this is also the same thing that the various sciences and the always 
problematically connected philosophies of them – social philosophy, philosophy of 
history, political philosophy, moral philosophy etc. – should admit and accept in the 
first place. 
 It is no accident therefore that Hobbes’s Leviathan, as shown also in the 
subtitle, treats indeed the matter that lies at the basis of the form and power of the 
ecclesiastical and secular state.
29
 And this matter is nothing else than the man! Of 
course, not in the sense in which it appears as a “subject” or “problem” of some kind 
of “anthropology”, but essentially. More precisely, as an utterly particular being in 
its own being and in the – deeply historical – unfolding and pursuit of this being. 
Therefore this is in fact what this entire study deals with from beginning to end. To 
such an extent that it handles even the state and all organs and organizations 
connected to it as an “artificial man” created – of course, particularly through human 
art – in an artificial way. The matter, as well as the creator of which is man 
himself.
30
 Hobbes clearly states therefore that “...I put for a general innclination of 
all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power, that ceaseth only in death.”31 
This ambition is general and unstoppably continuous because man “…cannot assure 
the power and means to live well, whitch he hath present, without the aquisitions 
of more.”32 However, in their lives conducted through and amidst these ambitions, 
the fear from death and being hurt necessarily makes people first create public 
authority and then obedience to it.
33
  
                                                 
29
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 3. 
30
 “…I will consider First, the matter, thereof, and the artificier; both witch is Man.” Ibid., 7. 
31
 Ibid., 66. (Emphasis added) 
32
 Ibid. (Emphasis added) 
33
 Ibid. (Emphasis added) 
 Death is therefore, on the one hand, an explicit end. In that very definite 
sense that this is exclusively what is able to end the ever newer longing for power, 
necessary for well-being. That is to say, death is specifically the end of life. On the 
other hand, however – precisely because of its nature as end, as that what ends life – 
death is also something which is fearsome for the living being, it triggers fear. But 
the constitutive fear of death for Hobbes is not merely a kind of paralyzing 
“feeling” or an overwhelming “condition”, but this is precisely what organizes and 
articulates the will – although prevailing amidst the longing for power, but creating 
public authority nevertheless – as well as the respect and obedience towards it. 
Which, therefore, has a decisive role and task in the further support and articulation 
of a life evolving amidst the – necessarily also “permanent and ceaseless” – fear of 
death. For public authority and the sui generis meanings of public authority outline 
and defend something – namely, human life itself – the loss of which cannot be 
compensated by anything.
34
 So, given that the human ways of self-preservation are 
connected to desires and ambitions, and under circumstances that all humans are 
actually equal in their essential aspects, they also inevitably pursue things that they 
cannot simultaneously enjoy. As a result, people will compete in their pursuits, 
therefore they will also collide since they can only actually satisfy their needs with 
the destruction or oppression of others. This of course also mutually threatens their 
security – and primarily the security of their lives. It is in fact everyone’s war 
against everyone, which lasts, unrestrainedly and hazardously for species and genus, 
as long as there is no public authority. But war is most characteristically “continual 
fear, and danger of violent death.”35 Death is therefore undoubtedly finitude. 
Man’s – so to speak – natural end, that is, the end which naturally pertains to man. 
The end which can indeed be “lived through” is the time that nature usually allows 
us.
36
 In this sense (as well) it is only death that can end the also human ambitions of 
gaining power. However, this end does not only “margin” threateningly human 
existence from the outside, at its edge, as a physical or natural feature, but death also 
becomes a real “inside” of human life – precisely by the actions of people. Like, for 
instance, the violent causing of death, violent threat of death in times of war. Which 
is, as we have seen, surrounded by constant fear. But death and the fear of death 
becomes an inner organizing force of the life-long articulation and pursuit of a 
meaningful human life and public life not only in this sense or direction, but, on the 
contrary, as a source of human feelings and ambitions specifically inviting for 
peace.
37
 To such an extent that everything that Hobbes directly and unhesitatingly 
calls “natural law” revolves around and connects in fact in its entirety to the above 
aspects and focuses of death. For he writes: “A LAW OF NATURE (lex naturalis) 
is a percept, or general rule found aut by reason, by whitch a men is forbidden to do, 
that, whitch is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the 
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same; and to omit, that, by whitch he thinketh it may be best preserved.”38 The “law 
of nature” described like this is connected therefore in its entirety, in all its aspects, 
and essentially with human life and being, living indeed because defined, 
interwoven and threatened by death. Just like everything else which derives from it 
as a consequence or conclusion. It is connected to a life which is – also essentially – 
outlined by its inseparable relationship and connection with death. Including 
primarily the kind of relation recognized by reason precisely as “law of nature”, and 
from which, as a prescription or general rule, it validates the “laws of nature”. Or 
rather: directly establishes! With all the established and validated consequences – 
like contracts, but also wars and peace, etc. – of these laws.  
 Therefore the case is not at all only about the fact that these rules and laws 
prescribed by reason and all the institutions connected to them, their creation and 
development are simply unthinkable without death, but, above all this, also about the 
fact that their entire being, the entire structure of their articulation and the entire 
changing and unfolding, reformulating meaning and operation of this structure and 
texture is always ultimately created, articulated, guided, pervaded and encompassed 
by the fact of death and its particularly human threat, directed towards, and 
pertaining to, human life – that is, man’s explicit and being-like, living pertinence 
and relation to this actuality, perspective and threat. So in the projection and 
creation of the state and its institutions, man “…is the foresicht of their own 
preservation, and of more contented life thereby...”39 And it has been clearly seen 
above what the provision for “self-preservation” and the “undisturbed unfolding” of 
human life means… Namely, that all this is indeed connected in its origins and 
meanings and the perspectives of its meanings to death and its – not merely denying 
or “negative” – threats, factically articulating life and particularly pertaining to life 
as its end! For which reason the public authority (state) is called “the great 
Leviathan”, that is, a “Mortal God” “being born”!40 This, the – mortal! – public 
authority thus born has various forms and branches sprouting from the same ground. 
Forms and branches which – stimulated by determinations and motivations also 
grown out from and reconnected to the same ground – constantly modify or change. 
These forms, their diversity, changes and possibilities are treated then in works of 
history and political science.
41
  
 Consequently, Thomas Hobbes’s significance and uniqueness in the 
philosophy of history is primarily due to the fact that not only does he not deny 
death, but he analyzes and presents it as an aspect and factor which determines 
history in all its decisive aspects and in an original sense – that is, as something 
which originates and articulates historicality –, and at the same time as being a 




 century  
philosophies of history, which are mostly explicitly joined with the horizons of 
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historiology in preparation and usually problematic. And in which – beyond some 







 etc.) – almost no kind of organic and 
structuring presence or significance of the “problem” of death can be found.  
In contrast with this, Hobbes makes it directly and fundamentally clear that 
all the formations, all the “phenomena” – law and the institutions of law, politics and 
the institutions of politics (the state and various communities, etc.), ethics and its 
“institutions”, religions and their institutions – as well as all the events, happenings 
or changes, processes (wars, confrontations, peacemaking, workings, etc.) the 
research of which, their formation and change in time etc., is the object of 
historiology – whether positivistic, historicist, hermeneutical or otherwise – are 
completely unimaginable “without” death, the constitutive presence of human death. 
That is to say, not only “generally speaking”, but also in a basic and essential sense: 
this is what they precisely derive from! Just like the changes of these “formations” – 
also in their origins and actual motifs and senses –, which also always send back to 
death. And send forth as well. However, this also means that historiology – and all 
other sciences as well, whether social or natural – also derive from here in a 
fundamental sense. Sciences can only have, and do only have a “history”, just like 
history has some kind of a science – including now also the science of the history of 
sciences – because these are, in this same basic aspect: essentially historical. For 
they are nothing else themselves than precisely the actual, but of course particular 
and determined modes of being of a being which is originally temporal due to its 
mortality. Within and through which this being conducts its own mortal life-being, 
necessarily in a temporal way, that is, in a constitutive and finite co-originality and 
co-constitution. History (also) therefore – how else could it be?! – derives, and gains 
its always actual weight and dynamism from where time originates. Namely, 
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 According to Droysen – schematically again – this science deals with a task which 
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precisely from death, from human finitude, mostly compliantly or derogatorily – or 
at any rate completely uncomprehendingly – called “mortality”.  
 In spite of this, Hobbes does not explicitly thematize death “itself”, in a 
face-to-face, particular meditative effort. Instead, it rather only “operationalizes” it, 
although only as a factor which creates history and constitutes and shapes it. With 
this – but in some very significant aspects precisely despite this – Hobbes stands 
nevertheless in the “schematism” of that history of the philosophy of history which 
Löwith characterized and identified as an inevitable impossibility to free oneself 




In conclusion, the novel efforts for the historiological investigation of death are a 
huge advancement. This research of course has only become possible through the – 
existential, but not necessarily reflected – loosening of historiological, as well as 
philosophical historical determinations. That is, in such a way only that meanwhile a 
fundamental and actual, factual, existential, and at the same time ontological and 
historical shift in focus happened precisely about the question of death. This shift 
has brought about in fact the historiological research of death as well. This of course 
also creates the possibility to raise anew – precisely in the system of relations of 
death and history – the question of the connections of death and historiology. 
Clearly, this relation cannot be restricted merely to the historiological and past-
oriented questions of the explicit, or more precisely, outlined problem of death. 
Rather, the issue is that – just like history itself – historiology is in fact in a constant 
and ontologically articulated – although seemingly epistemological – relationship 
with death. Although this relationship and connection mostly remains athematic for 
it, meaning that mostly it is neither explicit, nor thematized. 
 Perhaps nobody was more conscious of this than Jules Michelet, mentioned 
above in a footnote, for whom the awareness – or, what is more, the experience! – 
that the historian, looking back into the past, always researches the past lives of 
deceased people, was a recurring idea. Therefore the “kindness towards all the 
dead”, required also by scholarly honesty and sympathy, is a necessary condition for 
the knowledge of the past. Including those deceased who during their lifetime acted 
in a way disagreeable to us or harmful to their fellows. In the course of 
historiological research – just like, almost invisibly, in history itself –, all deceased 
people and generations, whether murderers or victims, somehow become in a very 
essential way the very own deceased of every living generation. The – “deserved” – 
memory of which, whether wonderful or terrible, must be guarded by the historian. 
With the clarification that “it can no longer be revived that what life has forsaken.”45 
All this inspired Michel de Certeau to claim: historiography wants to prove that the 
place where it is created is able to understand the past; it is a strange process which 
first claims death, this discursively always repeated rupture, and at the same time it 
denies the loss, maintaining the privilege for the present to summarize the past as 
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one knowledge. The work of death and work against death.
46
 It seems therefore 
that itself the science of history, recte: historical research and historiography as well 
are precisely and essentially the works of death which somehow, yet always 
motivated and stimulated by the actuality of death, still always works against death. 
It is something which essentially – or more precisely, athematically, that is, 
independently from the subject now analyzed – has to, and tries to turn death, 
exactly through death, but also in contrast to it, to the work and issue of a 
summarizing or analytical knowledge about the past, although now present, and 
primarily addressed to the present (while probably also looking towards the future). 
What is more, the existential distinction of historiology lies – or may lie – precisely 
in the fact that, searching for past lives and thing, that is, for our past, it gets, day 
after day, into an inevitable relationship with what we may also call “passing”. It is 
permanently connected therefore with time, or “this working of death”, while it also 
understands – or rather: can understand – itself as a “working against death”. Which 
of course always also derives from death… 
 So historiology and its interpretation and self-understanding may become a 
privileged domain and opportunity also because we can now dig deeper into 
questioning what the “workings of death” really means and what it really means that 
we, humans, always work somehow against the “workings of death”. Is this 
existential and ontological situatedness only and exclusively a peculiarity and 
characteristic of historiology? Or perhaps it emphasizes the same thing that 
Heidegger so vigorously stressed in his own time; more precisely, that Heidegger 
alone has ever stressed with such an unambiguous and uncompromising consistency. 
Namely, that human Dasein as such – which is we, ourselves –, with respect 
particularly to the possible completeness of itself and ourselves, ontologically, 
existentially, historically etc. somehow related to death, its death and our death, 
running forth with it and at the same time reflexive, is (a) being in happening and in 
progress in some respect. With the completion that this is not only related with the 
(equally metaphysical, ontological and existential) facticity of death and dying, but 
with everything in fact which forms human existence and its historical possibilities 
of being! Therefore the mortality of man is not only “proved” by the actuality of 
everybody’s dying, but also, essentially, by every and all of man’s modes of being! 
The very fact that, wherever there is man – no matter how primitively –, there are 
also camps, graves, settlements, buildings, organizations, customs, institutions, 
beliefs, communication networks and relations, particular human works and efforts 
(myths, knowledge, science, art, technology, wars, and comforting religions, etc.), 
betrays and proves the mortal nature of man and the human nature of finite, mortal 
life. In short, they prove the workings of death and at the same time the workings 
against or despite death. Since – as we have repeatedly emphasized – such a thing 
can only have its weight and meaning for the being of a mortally finite – so Dasein-
like! – being. A being truly immortal in any respect of being would never actually 
be forced into any effort of knowledge, creation or perfection. 
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 The question and questionableness of mortality is therefore about the truth 
of man, of the Dasein – and thus also being! And we, humans, can only search, 
question, or thematize this truth by means of philosophy in a way authentic for us, 
and co-respondent for the weight and force of an all-time historical – that is, one 
that articulates history –, and inevitable reiteration. Through philosophy which 
meanwhile also discovers and displays that a merely “thematic” – although 
evidently highly important – consciousness, possible in several ways and 
articulations, related to death and the events of dying does not exhaust and is not 
restricted only to mortality, mortal nature and especially “becoming mortal”… but it 
interests, articulates, surrounds and, of course, historically and ontologically holds 
the entire questionable beings of man – and being – and its whole responsibility as 
a real and questionable meaning, as all-time response(s) which actually decide 
history! 
 To approach the question of history and death as a real and serious matter of 
philosophy also means therefore to formulate why the human being philosophizes. 
Therefore philosophy and death, history and death, history and philosophy, death 
and the history of philosophy must – and should – have a fundamental relation (of 
being) with man. One that would count indeed as a sui generis philosophical and 
existential-historical project to “shed light” on. It is of course out of the question that 
we should now start to piously search, for example, for the “positive” sides of death 
next to its “negative” sides, or the “nice” and “constructive” aspects surrounding 
death’s “ugly” and “destructive” nature. On the contrary, this concern can only be 
about understanding that “nice” and “ugly”, “positive” and “negative”, “true” and 
“false”, “good” and “evil”, “destructive” or “constructive” are present exclusively 
“for” or inside the being of a dying being, who always somehow “understands” 
death, its own death as a possibility pertaining to itself, its own being, and endorses 
this understanding in a being-like, mode of being-like way.  
 Consequently, there is nothing more superficial than saying – as for example 
the old Paul Ricoeur, related to Lévinas, and in a counter-Heideggerian, quite 
conventionally moved manner – that human existence, human history, instead of 
essentially relating to death, to the exposedness to its own death, is in fact a 
historically unfolding being conducted against death and in spite of death. Which 
therefore always relates “negatively” to the “positiveness” of death, although in 
itself “negative”. That is to say, it exists against death and “in spite of” (its) death. 
But not opposing it, not facing it face to face, but mostly turning away from it. Of 
course, the belief or idea of “immortality” also fully belongs here. For this is also a 
highly explicit denial or “repression” of death. Therefore one must “define” 
“immortality” and all kinds of ideas and thoughts about it as the dying mortal’s 
ontological-existential inability to die, to become an actual mortal, which also 
decisively defines historicality itself and the articulation of history and its 
possibilities. Adding the clarification that in fact only the dying can be “immortal”. 
He who “meanwhile” – since factically always dies – may become a mortal in a 
historically decisive way. Consequently, the non-dying immortal would not only be 
“incapable” of dying, but would never even die. On the other hand, such a thing 
could not exist, not even “against or in spite of” death.47 Death or the ontological, 
existential and historical facticity of the possibility to become mortal is therefore 
simply a precondition of the latter – namely, being against or in spite of death. 
Including, naturally, the possibility of “ethics” or “the ethical”. Since this can only 
be meaningful and significant for a being who is mortal and as such – in and through 
history – “may” become indeed mortal. Therefore the so-called “transgression” of 
“being” or death by “ethics” and ethical ambition is none other in fact than mere 
senselessness. That is, the incomprehension of the ontological, existential and 
historical roots and origins of the ethical. Which stands again completely in the 
traditional and unquestioned mode of being against death, which denies it and 
“flutters” it. 
 Paul Ricoeur’s investigations are stimulated however also by the special 
ambition to make the philosophical interpretations of, or insights into history 
                                                 
47
 Heidegger in his later works, in reference to the fundamental aspects of being, reiterated 
and rearticulated by him – and primarily in connection with language –, speaks about 
Heaven and Earth, mortals and immortals. However, he unambiguously treats this latter as a 
non-human possibility. On the contrary: the mortals are (exclusively) the humans, who are 
never called “mortals” merely because their life is finite, but because they are able to die in 
their lives and with their lives! Immortals are therefore those who do not die… because they 
are not really alive. That is, they do not have a life pertaining and holding on to themselves. 
They are called and invited by the mortals to find their own abilities and possibilities in or 
through them. So there are actually no immortals without mortals, just as, without the 
immortals, there are no beings who can, or rather could die as mortals. The immortals and 
“immortality” therefore is not something that people should “aspire for” or pursue. For the 
man is precisely and clearly man by its ability and possibility to die. He would then precisely 
miss his own self – completely in vain in fact – if he would hope, desire or want to be or 
become immortal, instead of undertaking and deepening his ability to die. Consequently, the 
immortals can only acquire meaning if they assist man in his ability to die and the 
acceptance of this ability, by turning or guiding him back to himself over and over again. If 
they help him be indeed mortal, to become able to die and remain so. That is – of course, 
without any kind of  “facilitation” – they help him live as indeed mortals and not merely with 
“finite lives”. And only thus can mortals get into open and responsible relations with the 
dimensions of Heaven and Earth. Therefore the immortals cannot simply be “the gods”, but 
new gods only. Who would then acknowledge themselves that they can only be gods 
inasmuch as, and as long as there are mortals living who believe “in them” and turn to them 
to open up their own capturedness because they need to be eternally returned to themselves, 
from their turning to the Earth and Heaven (the Cosmos). “Afterwards” however the 
immortals are no longer gods, only deathless. They stay in such a relation with their own 
immortality than the beings with finite life – but unable to die – are with the end of their 
lives. Immortality is therefore by no means a human possibility! However, it is a human 
possibility for the man as a being with a finite life to become indeed a mortal. Certainly only 
because he, in and with his being, exists from the very beginning in his relation to (his own) 
death. Only because he exists as a being who foregoes and anticipates (his) death, and only 
because (his) death is therefore always a (particular) possibility for him, can the man turn 
away from it and deny it or, on the contrary, become mortal and a being existing despite his 
death. See Martin Heidegger, A dolog és A nyelv; (Das Ding und Die Sprache) – Két 
tanulmány (The Thing and The Language – Two studies), 2nd, bilingual edition (Sárvár, HU: 
Sylvester János Könyvtár, 2000), 113. 
available and “applicable” for the use of historians, that is, practicing researchers of 
history. Therefore he always searches for the crossing or overlapping points where 
the philosophical investigations and “terminological subtleties” connected to history 
– although always “surprisingly” – may productively and fruitfully meet and get into 
dialogue with the diligent daily work of the historian. The question of death and 
mortality acquires special importance in this process.
48
 This issue has recently 
become a historiological “problem”, a research “subject” of history. But how could I 
– or anyone – be a being existing against and in spite of death, my death and 
mortality in any other way than “meanwhile” somehow raising my inquiring 
“awareness” of death and mortality,and, again “meanwhile”, also relating to it in a 
well determined or rather outlined way? 
 Being against or in spite of death – precisely by its “negativity” or, more 
accurately, in its being as denial – simply presupposes some kind of assertion of 
death! If we did not know and understand – as if beforehand and in advance – in 
some “positive”, asserted way that we are indeed mortals, then we could not exist 
even against or in spite of death, or relate to it in such a way. So, not only is being 
against or in spite of death not a friendlier, more attractive or ethical “alternative” to 
a being-like and constitutive anticipation of death, but on the one hand it directly 
(pre)supposes it, on the other hand it is none other itself than one of the also being-
like – that is, factical and actually conducted – derivative modes of this relationship 
and anticipation.
49
 Such modes in which, against and in spite of death, they usually 
turn away – even if not “always” from death – from an existential and thoughtful 
anticipation, explicitly thematic and thematizing, undertaking and understanding, as 
well as facing the constitutive aspects of relating to death. And also in which, 
instead of the being-like acceptance of the ontological, existential and historical – 
actually constitutively metaphysical – aspects of death which face, understand and 
explain it, the trying and excruciating task of “wisdom” is to “accept” death  as 
“destiny” and as something “naturally” connected to the human body. Or such 
modes in which – at the same time – the focus gradually and sensibly shifts to the 
death of the Other and Others…50 But which build in fact the entrance hall to the 
repeated denial or at least turning away from death. Historiology and the work of the 
historian is therefore something which essentially – or more accurately 
athematically, independently of the subject just analyzed – is constrained and strives 
to turn death, particularly through death but precisely against it, towards the work 
and matter of a knowledge, summarizing or analytical, yet being present and 
primarily addressed to the present (but looking to the future. 
 While of course the historian is alive! And lives in such a way that he is 
mortal. That he will die. For the mortally living historian too, his (own) death “is” 
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always in his (own) future. As something that will inevitably be, and which 
therefore will hold
51
 his being or life. It is only in this constitutive future-ness of 
death for the living that the explicit and heavily outlined perspective can be revealed 
for the historian that he himself is also mortal, and even more than that, he is mortal 
precisely as a living being to-be-dying. That is, sooner or later he himself – with all 
his works – and together with his own “generation” will get to the “region”, 
dimension of death essentially constituted by dying – namely: the past – with which, 
or rather “against” which, the then also mortally living historians will “deal with” 
and research diligently in the future. In other words: death not only defines 
historiology in fact and actually as the athematic yet constitutive coming into being 
and connection of its “subject” to the actuality of death, but also in its all-time 
origin, ambitions and meaning always newly emerged but left unthematized. 
Precisely because it is precisely a determined action or directly mode of being of 
dying mortals, and this is why historiology may turn towards the research and 
analysis of the actions of mortals once living and now dead. With all its 
“epistemological”, methodological or other pitfalls or benefits. Let me repeat: there 
would be no history or historiology without death. And neither would there be 
philosophy of history.  
 Hopefully, it is now clear that this philosophy of history cannot possibly – 
and especially not “exclusively” – be any kind of epistemology or methodological 
aid for the science(s) of history… and also that it should not deal at all, even if only 
additionally, with something which – let’s say, in a “substantial” sense, using 
Danto’s expression – historiology “deals with”. Instead, the philosophy of history 
should particularly struggle with questions which historiology itself mostly fails to 
ask. It is a different question whether the “philosophy of history” does or would not 
precisely prove to be ontology. No matter how specialized and determined in its own 
history by the division of historiological disciplines, history and historical interest 
always derives from the problematic nature of Dasein originating in fact from its 
own mortality. Either in the sense that the majority of the questions, “issues” 
emerging in their being-present are permanently proved to be results of history in 
several decisive respects, or in the sense that a historical perspective is never 
superfluous for assessing the novelty of these questions. This way the current 
acceptance of these questions cannot happen without the historical investigation of 
things. Besides, more originally and essentially, any kind of “problem”, question or 
challenge – that is, not merely “historiological” – gains its actual weight from the 
fact that these are in fact problems, questions and challenges of the being and pursuit 
of this being of a finite being, finite in the sense of mortality. In short, all the 
problems, issues, tasks or constraints of the present ultimately gain their weight, 
importance, inevitability, comfort and simply their meaning from finitude, and by 
this they organically relate to time, the questionability of time. That is, also in 
short, to the question and questionability of “When?” From which derives also – 
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questioning it – the question of “What is time?”. Of course, further asked and 
unfolded in the direction of “What is history?” and “Where does it come from?”. 
 However, as the man relates – “in space and time” – to time, how he grasps 
it and interprets it, and how it shapes and creates in this respect the order of 
“historicality” that François Hartog also speaks about, ontologically presupposes 
that we understand or sketch in some way – if not otherwise, then “problematically” 
– where time comes from. That is, we somehow understand, validate, and ask the – 
essentially and originally categorial – question of When? For every single “order” 
of historicality – which Hartog identifies and analyzes – is nothing else in fact than a 
specifically articulated, factical – explicit or inexplicit – questioning of “When?”. 
This specific and factically articulated understanding in the historical articulation of 
temporality is always about what and how time is, can be, or “must be”. Which is of 
course completely impossible without the explicit or inexplicit questionability and 
“problematic nature” – at least as a “presuppositional” or “interrogative” 
background – of “When?” However, examining the question and origin of this 
“When?”, I have previously arrived to the conclusion that, regarding its ultimate 
source, it derives precisely from death, from a necessarily future and inevitable 
perspective of death, namely from and anticipatory human finitude shaping in the 
sense of mortality, and relating to death, as a Will-be-being. Or more precisely: this 
is where the future always comes from!
52
 This also means of course – and again 
decisively – that the always present, always timely questionability of historical 
interest derives from, and comes from the same place! From a time and temporality 
which comes from a future articulated, constituted and burdened by death. Which 
truly and actually connects “together” the past and the present now already as 
history in a being-like way, deriving from future, or rather from a specific horizon 
or perspective of the future from which it always gains its actual weight. As such a 
history which, and the process (and “consciousness”) of which are permanently, and 
from various “directions” – with Schopenhauer’s words – “interrupted” and “cut 
into pieces” by death. 
 May it be outlined either as historia vitae magistra, or by historiology itself 
as an apparently more elaborated “historical consciousness” of modernity, the 
origin, essence, stake and meaning of historical orientation or interest is always 
precisely this. Just like history itself, historiology also, and any kind of actual, living 
and motivated historical interest – including of course the philosophy of history – is 
both initially and ultimately grounded and articulated by death, by human mortality. 
From the beginning to the end. It is a different, yet not less important question 
whether historical interest is aware of this, or applies it indeed. Especially when it 
conducts its most specialized and “interdisciplinary” researches, separately for 
countries, regions, settlements, centuries, decades or years, months, days, major or 
minor events or even hermeneutical problems... Whereas the most important – if not 
only – question in history will apparently be: “To explain what is?”. For, 
paraphrasing William H. Dray, the duty of a historian is to unveil what was it what 
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really happened. And when dealing with this question, he provides an explanation of 
the events of a “this and this happened” type.53 
 In the meantime however it does not even emerge what it actually means 
that something HAD-BEEN, as neither does whether these HAD-BEEN-nesses 
presented as “those which actually are” or more precisely “those which actually 
Had-been” become “actually” PAST just like that, on their own? Namely, why 
would we people now alive have to know anything about what “actually happened” 
in the history of the once existing HAD-BEEN-nesses? What is the actual meaning – 
and not merely the “damages and benefits” – of historical knowledge? Beyond some 
commonplaces always remaining unconsidered. The most important problem 
however is still that during such researches it usually never becomes admissible or 
acceptable that historical questions – including all kind of questions of historiology 
and historiological “scholarliness” – are of such nature in fact that the inquirer 
himself is always and necessarily encompassed in their horizon as well. This is 
only how the former people of history and their former – that is, no-longer-being54 – 
things can become their own PAST for the always living “carriers” of historical 
interest, and free historical “knowledge” of meaningful and future-projected weight 
and significant for the directions of future possibilities for an all-time present. That 
is to say, not merely as a science of “things not necessarily worth knowing”, or as 
curiosities and events continuously becoming “former”, as Goethe had thoroughly 
warned us in his time. But a science of things which, as their HAD-BEEN-ness is 
turned into our PAST and accepted as such – that is, its actual make-pass – is a 
hermeneutical, factical, ontological and historical task, highly actual and awaiting 
and pertaining to us, which can only be possible to weigh by the view and 
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acceptance of the inherence of the relations between historicality and death, always 
sending back and forth to the future.
55
 That is, the way from death through 
temporality and historicality leads – back and forth – precisely to freedom, and from 
freedom through historicality and temporality to finitude. The historical way of the 
historical man and being, meant to ask the question of meaning. For what else would 
make a being have a history at all if not precisely that by which and from which it is 
explicitly historical in its being? And only by this can being itself, as well as those 
beings which only have a story – but not a history – become historical. That is, not 
merely in a substantive or substantial sense, but in an ontologically, existentially and 
historically constituted sense.  
 Therefore, far from speaking about the “present perspective” as a sort of 
inevitable and “implicit” circumstance which by its inevitable inseparability 
uncomfortably “relativizes” and “subjectivizes” all kind of historical research, one 
should rather see that historical research – in a most organic combination with its 
extensions to the past – should precisely appropriate this perspective of the present, 
right at its question-points, in a most radical way, that is, with a factic view to both 
its origins and its present problematic nature, therefore leading to – and actually 
coming and deriving from – the future.56 For, in the absence of this, it may be feared 
that the diligence of historical research is rather a kind of delay, of directly a 
“scientific” escape into the “past”. A past, of course, which is always ensured to 
belong to “anyone and no one”. So that, on the one hand, this past does not “oblige” 
anyone to anything, while on the other hand we are and will be almost completely 
and defencelessly exposed to it.
57
 Obviously, this is no different for the historical 
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 This must be emphasized in spite of the fact that historical restrospection does not suffer in 
fact merely from a lack of knowledge or information, but it also always has a particular 
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of the past. Trying to understand how far and in what way are the problems of the living, that 
is, weighty present determined by – what kind of – past, or trying to create possibilities or at 
and historiographic research of the theme of death. Since this mostly happens 
precisely without the actual, explicit and thematic acceptance of the overwhelming 
presence of death, and the also actual – being-in-action – confrontation with it. 
While of course the very “theme” of death, “directly” and certainly, sends to the 
future of the living – meaning also those who study it historically –, also coming 
directly from it. Always and inevitably. 
 This is naturally essentially connected with what Heidegger discusses in 
Being and Time as “the existential origin of historiology”, the analysis of which 
actually pertains to the investigation and explicitation of the existential and 
ontological historicality and history itself. However, it should be known in advance 
about such analyses that, with a view to their meanings, their purpose is such an 
insight and approach which consists not merely in the production and distribution of 
some kind of “objective” knowledge, but much rather in the thematic outline and 
articulation of the always “problematic” possibilities of being. For, irrespective of 
when, where, or by whom it is cultivated, historical interest and historical research, 
as well as historiology, primarily and essentially, is one of the factic, determined 
possibilities and modes of being of the Dasein, of man. In which he always opens up 
– or closes – windows to the inevitable seizure and carrying out of his ever newer 
possibilities of being. If only in the sense of that elementary yet fundamental respect 
that “The idea of historiology as a science implies that the disclosure of historical 
entities is what it has seized upon as its own task.”58 That is, the seizure and 
acceptance – and all its consequences – as one’s own task of the revelation of the 
being of a being to which this revelation and the “revealer” himself directly or 
indirectly pertains, and the being of which the revelation itself (historically) shapes, 
not merely as an “object”, cognitively or “phenomenologically”, but with regard to 
its possibilities. What else would such a revelation – or rather such a science! – 
gains its real weight and “import” from? All the more so because “Such historicality 
does not necessarily require historiology. It is not the case that unhistoriological eras 
as such are unhistorical also.”59 
 
4. Being and Time – death and history 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, it must be settled right at the beginning of this 
subchapter that Martin Heidegger did not have in fact any kind of “philosophy of 
                                                                                                                              
least measure for itself from the experiments and achievements as well as failures of the past 
for the current management of the weight of these problems. Now, this is what the 
“disciplinarization” of the historical interest seems to cover up. When the research of the past 
is not merely an end in itself, but only an automatism. This is of course also valid for the 
“history of philosophy” as well. The “historical researches of philosophy” regarding an age, 
period or thinker are mostly hardly related to those very “present” – timely – motivations 
which originally and organically create this concern implicitly in their own “problematic” 
nature, but they are the “scientific” operations of a sort of simple automatisms of the “history 
of philosophy”. Which “meanwhile” – and instead of repetition, which would mean nothing 
else than what stated above – continuously gain newer and newer inorganic and external 
“actualities”.  
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history”. His inquiries, thoughts and researches actually and essentially related to 
history and the question of history are so radical, organic, and central components 
of his philosophy that any kind of “disciplinary” or merely conceptual and technical 
understanding of these can only be counted as incomprehension and mistake. All the 
more so since Being and Time calls us mortals not “humans” but Dasein! And 
mainly because the “man” increasingly became not more than a “concept” or 
“term”, which moreover gradually dried to a terminus technicus. One by which we 
humans do not call, only discuss ourselves. That is, objectify ourselves. While a 
man objectifying himself by discussing himself… can only exist in mere 
“objectivations”, which are also objectified “objects” or “things”. This way, also 
“terminologically”, the Dasein does not simply leaves behind or simply pushes away 
or exceeds “the man” but – certainly critically – rather goes behind “him”. More 
precisely, man goes behind himself, and by this he opens up and surfaces himself for 
himself. His existence bound and held onto being, being-towards, coming and 
calling to being. This is how man becomes Dasein, that is, a being which had always 
been – as “man” also – and which calls, understands and validates himself as “here”, 
“being-here”, being-present. Which therefore he must comply with – and also with 
himself – in and by his being in the actual conducting of his life, and amidst 
permanent and continuous challenges. With the also actual, factic, and mode-of-
being-like response that I am here and I am present, we are here and we are 
present!
60
 This is evidently possible only and if this being stands somehow, always 
and actually, in his own possibilities, or if he grasps and outlines all other beings – 
including his own objectivations – again always and primarily with respect to their 
own possibilities. Dasein exists and stands thus in an understanding, that is, mode-
of-being-like relation with possibility. However, “whenever Dasein tacitly 
understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its 
standpoint. Time must be brought to light  – and genuinely conceived – as the 
horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for 
us to discern this, time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the 
understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which 
understands Being.”61 
 Temporality however means at the same time historicality. If and when it 
is, the Dasein is in an originally historical way. That is, it does not receive or take 
onto itself the attribute of “historicality” externally or somehow subsequently, as a 
result of some kind of prehistoric or extra-historic development or evolution, but: 
when and where there is, there exist a Dasein-like being, then and there it is already 
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“also” historical at the same time. However, the existing Dasein is always and 
primarily “in-between” birth and death, as a living and as such, relational extension. 
Extension is of course mobility, but the mobility of existence is not the movement of 
a thing at-hand, but occurrence. Therefore the occurrence is not a mere “happening” 
of something, but an extension with its own consistency, which – as constancy, 
independence of Itself – also extends. That is: it occurs. “On the other hand, it is by 
no means the case that Dasein ’is’ actual in a point of time, and that, apart from this, 
it is ’surrounded’ by the non-actuality of its birth and death. Understood 
existentially, birth is not and never is something past in the sense of something no 
longer present-at-hand; and death is just as far from having the kind of Being of 
something still outstanding, not yet present-at-hand but coming along.”62 But in a 
temporal way. The mobility of the occurrence lies in fact in the extension on the one 
hand and in temporality on the other hand, as the existential aspect of the 
interrelation between birth and death – actually as care. For the Dasein is indeed a 
kind of being whose play of being permanently “aims precisely at this being”. Such 
a being, that is, which is initially in a world so that it always is, exists anticipating 
itself, that is, being open to possibility. This also means that it discerns and projects 
as being the beings and itself – including its coexistence with others – from 
questionable possibilities or possibilities made and outlined as questionable. That is, 
it is in care.  
 In short, occurrence is none other than carrying out Dasein’s life-long and 
anticipatory-extensive factic pertinence to care. Occurrence is therefore in an 
original relationship with temporality and this relationship does not mean in the first 
place that it, say, happens “inside time” but that occurrence is the being and mobility 
of a being extending in anticipation of itself – and thus always returning to itself. 
Dasein and its character of being and ontological particularity lies in the fact that 
this being actually occurs. The being of the occurring being is not merely – or rather 
not “simply”, in the sense of in-between “life and death” – finite, but in such a way 
that it always relates to its own finitude in its own extension in occurrence, in a 
particularly being-like way. This is the meaning of the statement that Dasein is 
finite precisely by its being mortal. It is such that it occurs mortally, in the sense of 
mortality, and the other way around, it exists finitely precisely in this fundamental 
sense.  
 The process and “matter” of history is also not formed so that the initially 
isolated human or human-like individuals or specimens at the crossing point of a 
number of factors suddenly, then increasingly get somehow into the already 
autonomous turmoil of some of the more comprehensive and general connections 
mostly called “community”, “society”, “culture”, “interpersonality”, etc., which will 
then inevitably have their “stories”; instead, it is formed when and how the being of 
certain beings becomes occurrence – that is: Dasein – and together with it, 
historical. Recte: when certain beings become mortal. Or rather: when they become 
such that they can essentially and directly become mortal. That is, by and with their 
being they open up the possibility pertaining to them to relate and turn towards their 
death as a particular possibility. And by this and with this the world is also 
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constituted. Because: “the world has an historical kind of Being because it makes up 
an ontological attribute of Dasein.”63 It is therefore precisely fate, inseparable from 
death and mortality, which is the privileged occurrence which outlines and defines 
existence amidst time and temporality, the Dasein as historical, or as a free being 
open towards death. Such that is actually and essentially in-the-future in its 
extension, and which connects as such, also actually and essentially, in its own 
presence to the past, to its own, appropriated past! And only thus, only in this 
horizon does the occurrence of history become the occurrence of the Dasein, of 
being-in-the-world, the historicality of the world and world history as well. One in 
which fate turns freely and as a possibility to all the extensions – future, present, 
past – of the occurrence of history and its temporality. This is why actual 
historicality means for Heidegger fate and repetition as well.  
 The Heideggerian concept and articulation of repetition is again particular. 
It does not mean at all the reiteration of the same thing and the same way “now” or 
“today”, again, imperatively, as a copy or imitation, but exactly that “explicit 
bequeathal” in which the having-been-present Dasein and its possibilities of being 
are precisely “problematized”. Or rather: become questionable, as always actual 
responses to the questionable possibilities of a having-been-present Dasein. It is in 
fact the possibility which “returns” – or rather is reborn – in repetition, and not 
something which has once been or happened. Repetition does not answer of course 
the former possibilities of those already dead, by taking these upon itself in the 
present in some fantastic way over the distances of time, but in repetition the 
Dasein, amidst the questionable articulation and acceptance of its own being-here 
possibilities, acquires the inevitably appropriate – that is, open towards death – 
degree of challenges in his own being, as well as the heritage that can be found and 
earned through bequeathing. In a different approach however repetition can mean of 
course also the responsible present critical rejection of a past possibility. It is only 
the Da-sein, the questionability of the present and the explicit being-present of 
questions and questionability – or more precisely, their momentary rather than 
timely surfacing and undertaking – which may give birth to and organically 
articulate historical concern itself. However we have no other kind of possibility or 
horizon to access this questionability or its existential-ontological momentariness 
and references sending to the past than that which always derives precisely from 
death. And this highlights the connections of fate and repetition. For repetition 
proves, ever more clearly, to be something which always articulates and constitutes 
fate by its momentariness in the openness – and we should add: creativity – of 
freedom. In contrast with the mere display of the “past” or the mere projection of the 
present onto the past… and of course also with a future outlined as mere coming. It 
is now clear that for Heidegger the Dasein’s attachment and relating to death is both 
ontologically and existentially – that is, historically – indeed constitutive. That is, it 
does by far not mean, or even less exhausts in a “well-tailored” thematization of 
death as such. Namely, as people have publicly thought or behaved about death and 
its matters in time. The constitutive relation to death understood as mortality 
characterizes the being of Dasein in its (always possible) entirety, and what is more 
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– precisely with respect to the direct possibilities of this “entirety” – it pervades and 
articulates this being. Therefore it defines it! Together with historicality and history, 
and of course freedom, also constitutively – that is, even athematically – connected 




There is no contradiction or nonsense about a statement that says: all the previous 
history of mankind – defined by death and dying in the sense articulated above – is 
mostly still the history of the escape from, and “denial” of death. “The” history 
which is now studied by the historiological research of death as a self-imposed 
subject is in fact the history of the explicit denial of, and escape from death which, 
in spite of it, is originated by and structured, articulated and constituted by the 
fundamental ontological and factic nature of human death and mortality, mostly 
athematically, yet still constitutively for historicality itself. However, this can also 
be revealed, or can only gain a – necessarily critical and “dismantling” – insight if 
the historical and ontological question of death is repeatedly and radically 
questioned not – or not only – as a traditional, yet “actual” and novel 
“historiological” problem, but as a present and current – and as such radically 
historical – (philosophical) question, with the determination and weight appropriate 
to its actual oppressiveness, pertaining to us in actu. In a repeated questioning which 
may – in Nietzsche’s words – open up and support a new history: as a history of 
being and of “man”, of Dasein that has become mortal indeed and has accepted, 
faced and validated its mortality in a being-like way.  
 However, any discourse about “any” kind of “end” of history is unfounded 
which does not essentially reckon with, or outline this end as the coming to an end 
of man as an earthly being or race. A “perspective” which, in its own way, 
undoubtedly exacerbates the “historically” “unpleasant” and “uncomfortable” 
matters and things of becoming a mortal. In exacerbates and hinders at the same 
time. But it does not make it more difficult, since this “exacerbation” and 
“hindrance” mostly precisely functions as a facilitation amidst the escape and 
turning away from death and mortality. Francis Fukuyama does also not speak of the 
“end of history” as the discontinuation of events considered to be historical, or the 
“natural cycle” of “birth, life and death”, but – similarly to Hegel and Marx, but 
rather only with reference to them – only about the fact that in liberal democracies 
mankind in its ideological evolution has reached that “ideal” condition which cannot 
be perfected any longer. This is also – although seemingly with regard to its “end” – 
only about what is history like and how it “is”? Or, whether or not it has any kind of 
direction, an internal, sui generis tendency, or an “end” – although not sending forth 
to any termination? And not about where the history comes from, is constituted and 
happens in fact, which is always problematic as to how it is in its dynamics, and how 
it must be studied, or what is the possible meaning and yield, or damage and risk of 
such a study…64 
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 The main problem here is precisely that, to call a highly “problematic” ideal 
state of mankind’s ideological development the “end of history”, means nothing else 
in fact than to forget and veil – and thus “facilitate” – the highly explicit and 
constitutive perspective of the actual finitude, end and termination of history. 
Irrespective of whether or not mankind (and the western man) has reached indeed in 
liberal democracies the ideal ideological form impossible to be further perfected! 
This veils precisely the perspective that could and should be undertaken explicitly 
and thematically in connection with the insight into the essence of history. That is, 
what is history and where does it come from? Of course, not by “analyzing” it 
merely “in itself”, or in its differentiation from other regions of being (e.g., from 
nature, or the “world of ideas” or “the otherworld”), but on the contrary, as a 
particular, therefore finite–temporal–mortal pertinence to being, and as its 
particularly constitutive pertinence to us. As an all-time and actual happening of a 
being open to possibility as possibility and being in a questionable and inquiring 
relation of meaning and being with the beings, with regard to itself and its weight 
outlined amidst the pertinence to this being, holding and being held. Which of 
course also defines or refines the question regarding the “meaning” of history! Or 
connects it to the question of meaning, the relations between meaning and question, 
meaning and questioning. With regard to the fact that history is because and ever 
since there is a being – coming to being, to existence – “one” finite, explicitly 
mortally finite, which therefore relates to its finitude in a being-like and mode-of-
being-like way, bringing-to-life its questions of meaning. In other words, by this, 
history is because and in such a way that it has (will have) an “end”. There is history 
therefore because there is a being, having come to life, whose being in its freedom is 
indeed (a) Will-being!
65
 That is, one that is held in its being by the fact that it 
always Will-be and how it Will-be. It will be in such a way that, and because, it is 
mortal. That is, because while being alive, it will always die – differently, under 
different circumstances or at different ages – and also because thus it has come to a 
being held and constrained to itself which if finite – ever since its creation – both as 
a species and as a race. That is to say, finite not only in the sense of being destroyed 
or extinct, but in a mortal way. Or, the other way around, because, while being 




Human life on Earth 
Earthly life and the future horizon of the destruction of its conditions and 
possibilities – outlined by the cosmic perspectives of the Sun and the solar system – 
concerns not only humans but, sooner or later, all other living beings and life forms 
on Earth. This case brings about radical and serious consequences with regard to the 
existence and perspectives of man and history alike. The weight and oppressiveness 
of these perspectives is usually eased through various and, at least seemingly, much 
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varied ways, avoiding thus the need to consider and think them through. One way is 
of course the End of the World and the ascension to Heaven connected to the 
apocalyptic last judgment. The other is apparently more “philosophical” and is 
particularly connected – even if mostly not admittedly – to the interpretation of 
Heidegger’s thoughts on Dasein. This – as repeatedly claimed – does not say 
anything more or different only about “man”, but also means a calling or invitation 
which can be applied in fact to any “intelligent” being of the Universe. That is to 
say, the “extraterrestrial intelligent beings” can also only be Daseins in their own 
way, that is, being-heres (or rather beings-theres), and we, earthly Daseins can only 
get in any kind of meaningful – even if “combative” – relationship with them 
because of this. All these can even be meaningful considerations, but they can only 
gain their actual weight with the condition that we make sure that the stake of these 
considerations is by no means the “easing” of this Da, this “here”. Or, perhaps, a 
new dissolution or fluttering of Sein, of Being and Existence. So that we might 
disregard again that fundamental aspect that “man”, or simply the being which now 
calls itself Dasein as its own accessibility and openness is only what it is as an 
Earthly being! So that it is what it can be at all – as a non-Earthly being – only as 
an Earthly being. The situation is probably similar with “intelligent” extraterrestrial 
beings of a being-here-like, therefore Dasein-like, nature. These can also be being-
here(there)-like beings only as they are present for themselves in their possibilities 
of being in relation to other surrounding beings, in a being-like and mode-of-being-
like way. So in this essential aspect they are not only Other, but entirely Different 
being-here(there)s or Daseins! To these, a third facilitation connected to the “end of 
history” adds up, which yields the possibility that, with the development of science 
and technology, earthly Dasein will sooner or later create the conditions for itself to 
simply move away, before the end of the Solar system or of anything else, from the 
planet which gave birth to it and carried it all along, but which is now squeezed of 
everything either by this being or by cosmic forces, and made it impossible for 
living, for life… Now, without dwelling much on how fantastic or “real” this 
possibility is – including the “social”, “ethical”, as well as “historical” complications 
inherent in such a planetary mobility – it should also be asked whether this Dasein, 
as a non-earthly being, would be the same kind of being there as well? Or – in 
perspective – we ourselves. As also whether is this perspective as such not a kind of 
relevant, meaningful but at the same time very ordinary ontological escape from 
ourselves, from being? Or whether is it not an also ordinary escape from history – or 
rather: from the ontology of historicality itself – that is, from death? Apart from the 
fact that the Dasein moving away from Earth should also leave behind its own 
earthly history, its life-like being – and also “death-like” being, namely its 
graveyards and tombs – or at least pack it up for itself compressed into mere 
“information”, the “human” race, in the course of the (e)migration of its worthy 
“representatives”, must inevitably proliferate to form not only a new generation, but 
outright a completely different Dasein. However DIFFERENT may this Dasein 
deriving from humans be or become, it will fail to become either immortal or 
endlessly “historical”. On the contrary, just because it is mortal, and as such, 
historical or historically finite, can the being came into being and present as Dasein 
keep opening responsibly the incidental possibilities of its extra-terrestrial existence. 





 History therefore cannot have any kind of “meaning” outside or beyond 
itself which will shine somewhere “after” or “behind” its end. And which, of course, 
would always prove meaningless and – as seen at Löwith – completely inaccessible.  
 It is a different question however how all this is connected to the “natural 
cycle of birth, life and death”.66 Is this “cycle” “natural” in the sense that it is, let’s 
say, biological (belonging to nature), in opposition to “social”, “cultural” or 
“intellectual”? or in the sense it forms the otherwise non-social “foundations”, 
“sources”, “conditions” or “parameters” of social formations or simply 
“societization”? As something which, for and from the point of view of history and 
historicality, is precisely not historical, or as we have said, actually without history? 
Something which only has a story, but not a history? 
 The cycle of birth, life and death seems “natural” first of all because it 
pertains to being, to the living being as nature, living nature. As something which is 
different but at the same time is somehow inevitably “common”, overlapping and in 
this sense somehow still identical with man, “society”, “culture” or “history”. But, 
just like human life, human death, although it is according to physis, in the above 
sense is not at all “something natural”, not a “natural event”. More precisely: not a 
historical “course”. But one which does not only alternate in its cycles connected to 
birth and life, but also changes. And not merely “under the impact” of the forces of 
nature – let’s say, biological evolution in the narrow sense. But people are born, live 
and die differently in the “cycles” of birth, life and death, which should actually be 
called history! This can only happen this way because they always stand in a relation 
of being, open to possibilities and meanings, with their birth, life and death, dying, 
which factically precisely means, and is “connected” to, their being, their existence. 
Therefore, regardless of how many supposedly “natural” and “hard” “elements” the 
cycle of human birth, human life and death essentially contains in its overlapping 
“composition” – that is, by the opening and closing, being-like or relation-of-being-
like nature of the physis, the pertinence to being, forming a particular, new 
dimension of being – it is “natural” precisely in a Dasein-like way, and not in a 
“physical sense”. Thus can it be precisely historical, or thus can, and does, it 
constitute historicality, that is, history itself! So, we can say that the history which 
the historiological research of death has appointed as its own subject of research is 
essentially the history of the denial of, and escape from, death, which is – although 
athematically, but constitutively for history – nevertheless originated from, and 
structured, articulated and “constituted” by, the fundamental ontology and facticity 
of human death and mortality. However, this also means then that it is, above all and 
mostly, the history of the disclosure, “understanding” and recording of death from 
the point of view of the fear from it, or a history articulated by precisely this.  
                                                 
66
 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History. 
 Perhaps it could also be understood – like for Hegel – as the wilful defeat or 
transcendence of this fear. Since the militant and wilful defeat of the fear of death 
risked in favour of recognition, control and domination of the other, about which 
Hegel speaks as preconditions of “historical” success and victory, illustrates and 
justifies both a basic aspect of the history-constituting role of death, and also the fact 
that death in this history was and is primarily, if not exclusively, revealed from the 
point of view of an explicit and “thematic” fear from it – and not from that of 
understanding and recording it from its problematic foundations. And it proves to 
be even truer as the ideological, political, institutional, philosophical, 
anthropological or psychological efforts which should be of assistance in gaining 
more insight into it become more outlined or intrusive.  
 We have seen in connection with Hobbes as well that the kind of thinking 
which understands and explains fear, and particularly the fear of death merely as a 
kind of paralyzing “feeling”, in its mere “negativity”, is a dead end. On the contrary, 
fear, and particularly the fear of death continuously articulates the world of man 
with regard to its historical unfolding, always inevitably and not merely as a 
psychological “overtone” to be tempered. This means that no kind of human caution 
or circumspection is possible without fear. When man builds a house which will 
possibly not collapse to crush him to death, although by this he does not explicitly 
“thematize” and “defeat” his fear of death, this fear is in it nevertheless, and by ways 
of caution, calculation, provision, or circumspection always operates in the 
accomplishment of this task. The same happens when we say about something that it 
is completely harmless. Since this also needs the outlining of danger, harmfulness, 
while dangerous can only be something which, ultimately, is in some kind of 
relation with the threat of death of life as such. Something which we are afraid of, 
must be afraid of, and it is “advisable” to be afraid of. Man is not only “afraid” of 
(his) death, but he also related to it, and with it, to his fear of death. But it is short-
sightedness not to understand that any kind of human attitude towards the fear of 
death, as well as its heroic defeat, is itself motivated, articulated and pervaded by 
this constitutive, therefore not solely “negative” fear. For it if was not so, then it 
should not, and indeed, cannot be either “defeated” or dominated. Let alone 
“managing” it, as many psychologists would want. Not to mention that fact that the 
endangering of life – that is, exposing it to a threat or risk of death – of which Hegel 
speaks in a general tone in The Phenomenology of the Spirit as one of the historical 
conditions of the earning and primary unfolding of freedom and as a process, an 
occurrence of freedom, can only have such a role or function if, and with the 
condition that this life – including the freedom possible in it and through it – exists 
and outlines from the beginning in a being-like and relation-like connection with 
(its) death. And articulates as well. Otherwise human life could not be risked at all in 
any way, not even in the direction and for the purpose of freedom.  
 But what does it actually mean to “risk life”? For it can be – and must be – 
lost even without its explicit, definite risking! Is it not rather the case that human life 
can – and often must – be risked just because it is originally mortal? That is, 
exposed – although with some caution – to a definite and at least broadly outlined 
and projected threat of death. So that in this “exposition” the target is not death, 
one’s (own) dying, but precisely the “recognition”! That is, supremacy, domination, 
victory. The actual possibilities of the stake(s) and decisions of the “struggle for 
recognition” are in fact: death; or victory and domination; or defeat, subordination, 
servitude. All three however essentially concern human life and its possibilities as 
such. That is, its human possibilities. Such of which it turns out, consequently, 
repeatedly and in this respect as well, that at the bottom of its essence it is outlines 
and decided amidst its constitutive relation, attitude, threat and risk – and also denial 
and concealment – towards (its own) death. Thus: it occurs. With that further critical 
clarification that the “superior”, “intellectual” and “ethical” ability of man to 
overcome his “instincts” and especially his basic instincts of life preservation in 
themselves do not originate or explain any kind of “history” since man could use 
this ability even in suicide, for example… and does use it quite often in fact. So, in 
this case as well, (human) life and (human) death and dying can only have an always 
coming-(in)to-being, therefore existential and ontological relation, much deeper than 
its “intellectual” and “moral” meaning aspiring for elation. One that radically 
originates and articulates morals and “morality” itself in its very historicality! For 
really, actually “immortal beings” could not possibly have any kind of morality, as it 
would be, precisely ethically and morally, completely weightless and therefore 
meaningless for them. The weight and stake of morality and the origin of these can 
only be a historical life intertwined by (one’s own) death and the perspective and 
threat of (one’s own) death, mortally returned to oneself, and connected with the rest 
of – living, dead, or not yet born – mortals. And this is precisely what the great 19th-
century spiritual philosophies of history as well as the historiology of that age 
disregard. Precisely during a time when the specificity and relevance of “human 
things” for the philosophy of history is identified to be in their “moral” and 
intellectual “nature”. The case is similar with the great German philosophies of 
history as well, which are generally against Hegel (especially in what regards 
Hegel’s concept about the pure rationality and clarity of history), but are 
nevertheless completely consonant with him in the emphasis on history’s 
determination by intellectual and ethical aspects.  
 In what regards the analyses conducted in this paper, they are rather 
focussed on the ontological “determination” of history. The kind of “determination” 
which always grounds the appearances and partial truths of the in turn intellectual-
ethical-ideological, or economic, material and natural (biological, geographical, etc.) 
“determinations” of history. To such an extent that it may indeed form and solidify 
the quite strange “situation” and idea that although history has long before “come to 
an end”, it continues nevertheless in the “events”. Moreover, it continues most 
joyfully and truly exactly after it has “come to an end”… The situation when the 
“end” of history, or rather the constitutive finiteness of history – and of course the 
essential historically constitutive aspect of finitude – has no real weight any more. It 
is not at all only the “modern” (western) society which denies death or turns away 
and escapes from death or the raw fear of death. On the contrary, every age had and 
continues to have its particular kind of fear of death. This also proves only that, 
despite all its appearances of being an eternal problem, death and the question is 
death is to the highest degree and in a very particular way historical. Firstly, in such 
a way that there is probably no kind of “ideal” age in history in which man would 
have been in an ideal or carefree relationship with “death”, in which death was not 
any kind of oppressive and “unsolvable” “problem” for him. And secondly, in such 
a way that in a fundamental sense history and “historicality” itself derives from 
death and “mortality”.  
 It is an important question however – therefore it must be asked – whether 
historiology, that is, the ever sprawling historiographical research of death, reckons 
with it, or how it reckons with it. For, as it has been repeatedly claimed, these 
researches never re-question but rather only take into account and interpret the 
former “meanings” and understandings of death in various ages, so that, meanwhile, 
they also try to surface the various social or other “functions” of these. Additionally, 
the historical knowledge of death also reacts to the modifications which have 
occurred in these functions and interpretations in the course of times. As mentioned 
before, it is not incidental that historians speak about the “system of death”, since by 
this they highlight the complexity and variety of roles that the structure of death has 
undertaken in various ages. By this, it becomes increasingly clear that the “historical 
perspective” as such is simply inevitable for the understanding of the actual 
significance of the subject of death for human existence. Nevertheless, the actual 
situation is rather that these researches, as a critique of a “present” only sketchily 
outlined, tend to confront this present with the “more ideal” conditions of a better 
analyzed, yet already lost, former age. In which, perhaps, humans were in a 
“domesticated” or “tamed”, (as if) almost friendly or carefree relationship with death 
and dying. In such cases it is usually the Middle Ages, or at least some pre-modern 
age which seems to appear particularly glorious. Admirable or directly enviable 
about these ages would be precisely the fact that then “…dying meant 
transformation, and death a stage of passage to another life”.67 The legitimacy of 
such an interpretation was largely, yet essentially, based on the institutionalization 
of mythical-religious systems, which at the same time offered the certainty and 
security of non-dying death.
68
 So these ages should not (have had to) “repress” 
death – as it allegedly happens ever since modernity.  
 It must be repeatedly asked therefore: what does it actually mean that dying 
is “transformation”, and death is “the stage of a passage to another life”? And what 
does it mean for this to be presented and served as offering “the certainty of 
security”? But what else could this mean if not precisely that – at least until the 
“beginning of modernity” – death “meant” precisely non-death, and dying non-
dying? Namely, that even in these long and allegedly enviably “carefree” ages (as 
well) death as well as, even more, dying was in fact “denied”. It is incomprehensible 
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however why could we not regard the denial of death a particular and highly radical 
“repression” of death even if is was often publicly “displayed” while being denied? 
In other words: it was denied particularly in its being displayed, and it was 
“displayed” precisely in the denial of death. Well, in contrast the former and alleged 
“homogeneity” of the image of death was lost indeed in modernity. To such an 
extent that it cannot be secured even to this day… 
 Nevertheless, it would do no harm to investigate the possibilities of 
historiological research on death with reference to a different – critical, therefore 
negative – perspective, and mainly to apply this perspective as well. What I have in 
mind is that it would primarily be historiology itself which could demonstrate or 
honourably acknowledge that during, and despite, the methodical research of the 
history of death – that is to say, of the history of the denial and repression of death – 
as well as the history of the variety of mentalities connected to it has not come 
across any single case, valid for its discipline, in which someone would have 
avoided or in a different respect survived his own dying! Whereas it would be just 
befitting for a science – especially if it almost infatuatedly deals with the criteria and 
methodologies of its scholarliness – to represent this as well, in addition to various 
images of death etc. 
 The actual situation with “modernity”, just like the “present” age, is much 
more complicated. We should therefore consider more seriously the conclusions of 
researches which qualify the public discourse on the contemporary cover-up and 
tabooing of death - instead of a serious inquiry – as more of a commonplace-like and 
superficially or automatically repeated slogan, emphasizing that it is precisely the 
modern (western) society which eventually started to seriously and responsibly deal 
with the oppressive human things of death and dying. Indeed, nothing proves it 
better than the emerging hospice system and its equally novel mentality, 
“philosophy”. Or the recent emergence of the “discipline” of thanatology or, say, the 
legislation on, and practice of euthanasia, or the explicit caregiving and palliative 
undertaking of “accompanying into death”.69 Which of course also reveals that 
modernity, our own age, approaches the inevitably actual question of death 
particularly by concentrating on dying and the process and event of dying. That is, 
with a focus on the very aspect which has mostly been neglected so far, since the 
escape from death and the denial of death as dying was primarily and repeatedly 
fuelled by the escape from this aspect. 
 It is a different question altogether whether our age undertakes and applies 
this specific and novel perspective, motivation and intention. However, it seems 
doubtless that all this is part of that actual and current change and mutation of 
mentality which triggered in the first place the historiological – and also 
anthropological, psychological, or social – research and investigation of death. It is 
therefore part of the mutation in the preparation of which philosophy has accepted a 
huge, if not decisive role, despite all its basic contradictoriness and problematic 
nature. And in the first place by the works of radical and allegedly “subversive” 
thinkers like Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, or Heidegger. This is not to say 
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of course that our age no longer tries to escape, deny or veil the question of death 
and dying itself. And even less that the contemporary man had indeed succeeded to 
become mortal. But the outlines of certain possibilities begin to show – and among 
these also the possibilities of autonomous, free and forceful thinking – which would 
now indeed be a sin to – again?! – give up or miss. On the contrary, these should be 
protected and applied.  
 Furthermore, although death and dying is indeed increasingly medicalized in 
contemporary society, it is not merely this modern society which “institutionalizes” 
death. On the contrary again, death and dying were probably institutionalized from 
the beginning, and various kinds of formal, informal or symbolic institutions or 
powers of various complexity were employed around them.
70
 As a fight for the 
dominance over death and dying, or more precisely for any kind of dominance over 
the event of dying – of course, essentially over life, outlined and usually 
“comforting” not amidst dying, but precisely amidst the denial of death. A fight 
which, meanwhile – that is, amidst the denial of death – becomes an essential and 
very efficient corner stone and purpose of the dominance over life or the articulation 
of life.
71
 So these days we should indeed think more fundamentally of the historical 
possibilities of man and human existence which not only dies, but is already truly 
mortal. That is to say, it has truly and explicitly become mortal already. Because it 
could well be that this would now truly and actually be part of a story, as Nietzche 
suggested, more glorious than any other previous stories. Part of such a story in 
which it is always explicitly questionable, and it is always radically and originally 
asked whether we understand – or better understand – time and history? Whether we 
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Claude Schmitt, Dictionnaire raisonné de l’Occident Médiéval (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 771–
789. To such an extent that the dead were also ranked: worship was only due to the dead 
bodies or remains of saints, so that the living, although praying for their dead, addressed their 
prayers to the saints.  
understand, or better and more seriously understand its pertinence to us, or the 
questionableness and particular question-nature of this pertinence? And with it also 
whether we understand it indeed that the real “problems” are primarily not caused 
by the insufficient, unclear or ambiguous knowledge due to the lack of historical 
“information” or “data” – that is, of historical “omniscience” –, but, on the contrary, 
precisely by the “certainties”. In other words, by the fact that every kind of really 
fundamental and essentially categorial certainty will sooner or later prove to 
actually, originally and precisely be: a question! Which must always be asked and 
re-asked. This way it might also be revealed that, while asking them – these 
questions deriving precisely from certainties – always lead the all-time inquirer to 
what he must call (so: we must call) death from one direction, and history and 
freedom from the other! So they lead to further questions which are co-originary 
and co-constitutive, they have common origins and they are questionable in a way 
always interconnected in origin and always sending back and forth to one another. 
And which, this way – inside and through us – always question and search for the 
inquirer’s and their own all-time truth. Since it is a truly and actually inevitable 
question What? is the “meaning” of human existence, human life, human history 
amidst death or in the “shadow” of death, or, perhaps even more seriously, amidst 
the finitude of human existence, the human “race”? 
 However, the meaning of human existence, human life and human history 
cannot be sought from the outside – since, as we have asked already, Who? and 
How? could search for it “from there” with a real insight and weight? – neither 
“outside” of it or “beyond” it. For how should we know that this “meaning” 
“outside” or beyond living being and history pertains indeed to this or that being and 
history? By the fact that the meaning and human existence and human history can 
only be sought (in) there, from where itself the question referring to meaning 
derives! The question is therefore actually What? is the meaning of human life and 
human history, or more precisely What? is the meaning and being-like weight of 
these questions as questions? Since, as long as we do not clarify it or understand it 
to a certain degree, all kind of inquiry about the meaning of being, life, or history 
would become completely weightless and as such, completely arbitrary in its 
answers as well. However, if by “meaning” we do not simply and hastily understand 
a kind of purposeful – perhaps ideal, yet transferably beyond-like – condition, nor 
some kind of mechanical, but somehow externally determined “function”, 
inaccessible and incontrollable as to its origin, and if we decide to investigate what it 
the ratio of meaning, or the question of meaning, where it comes from and what it is 
based on, then in order to thematize it, we shall need a shift in focus. For human 
existence, human life and human history do not “receive” their meanings or any kind 
of meaning merely externally and independently from themselves, but meaning can 
only be born, outlined and unfolded for man in the search or inquiry of that very 
meaning. And closed as well. So that, in the strictest sense of the word, man 
explicitly and in a being-like manner comes onto the meaning or meanings in his 
searches and inquiries! 
 Furthermore, if by inquiry we do not only mean a kind of superficial staring 
at anything, but – as seen above – precisely the “constitution” of meaning, then it 
results that meaning itself – and by this inquiry as well – can only derive and 
originate from where they gain their weight and their stakes. Namely, precisely from 
finitude, from human death.
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 Under the circumstances that all search and inquiry is 
actually and originally precisely a kind of relation to human death, albeit mostly not 
a thematic or thematized kind.  
 For its thematization however there is a definite need for a shift of focus. 
Namely, we must now proceed with the thematization of freedom – in a particularly 
ontological way, and in an essential relation with the also ontological issues of death 
and history, therefore maintainable in their inquiring relationship.  
 
5. History – Freedom – Death 
The actual meaning of human freedom or its explicitly occurring “actuality” or 
validity is by far not despotism or imposing someone’s own will, nor an ultimately 
meaningless and weightless “universal power or ability” of any kind of 
omnipotence, but much rather a living “problem” being in action, or an explicit and 
carried out question and inquiry. Or rather the “problem” of the existence and 
unfolding of being-here, of Dasein, always constituting and articulating it. 
Ultimately, in fact, the question and inquiry of being itself, always open and 
unravelled for the sense of being and the being. With even more precision, the 
“essential problem” or questionability and question of the unfolding of this being 
itself, appearing again always like a new challenge, and in this particular way 
proving always constant and persistent. Therefore freedom can only derive and 
come from where the weight of being also derives and comes from. And to or 
“towards” where inquiry and through or within it also the questionable, problematic, 
weighty, risky freedom – structurally and in a being-like manner – necessarily 
directs. That is, from the future. However, the future itself, just like also time, derive 
and come precisely from finitude, from human death.  
 It has been revealed so far that history, human history and historicality also 
derive and “come” in fact from there. Freedom and history are therefore not only 
connected “conceptually” or refer to each other as formal or partial “overlappings” 
of conceptual contents or circles, but in ways much more fundamental and essential. 
That is, ontologically! With respect to their origin, articulation, being, and also to 
what they consist of and how they exist. Previous analyses offered insight in fact 
into how history, death and freedom pertain to us precisely by constituting each 
other, and this is also how they pertain to, proceed to, and mutually find, each other 
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 Which does not mean again, that the quite disagreeable and uncomfortable philosophy 
would be thinking or make one to think of death all day long! For, regardless of whether or 
not we accept or understand Spinoza’s geometric and axiomatic statement that the free man 
thinks less of nothing than death, and that the wisdom of the free man lies particularly in his 
meditation on life, and not death, we should understand that the issue in not of a 
quantitative nature. The question and the stake is not therefore whether man thinks “much” 
or “little” of death, but whether he really thinks meanwhile?! Man could think – and does 
think often! – of death all day long, or even for millennia, without seeing himself or his own 
freedom in it. Perhaps, he thinks “about it” precisely because, altough he cannot avoid it, it 
stands in his freedom – while turning away and escaping from it – to not see either his death 
or his freedom in it. Including also the history constituted by the freedom of such a 
“wisdom”, and the ontological insight connected to it.  
as well. Moreover – I cannot stress it enough – as a mode of being and particularity 
of being. That is, precisely as the constitution of the lasting, ontological identity of 
man, we ourselves, the Dasein. Which must be outlined and validated over and over 
by explicit inquiry. Namely, it must be conducted and enforced. And in which 
history, death and freedom find and keep the man in being while constituting and 
“holding” him, and pertain to each other. It has also been found that death as a 
particularly human possibility also has a question-structure. A structure, that is, 
which (“also”) structures and constitutes at the same time the essence of freedom. In 
a being-like way. Or rather: in a mode-of-being-like-way. That is, in the facticity or 
actuality always referring to the possibilities of being of the all-time unfolding 
modes of being – all human modes of being. That is, as occurrence, as the 
occurrence of history. Consequently, the structure of death is constituted by 
freedom, and the structure of freedom by death: as history! The revelation or 
research of this cannot be a “subject” of any kind of historiology or anthropology, 
but it is something that can only be hoped to be enlightened by the philosophy of 
history – precisely by a philosophy of history understood, accomplished, and taken 
to the end as ontology. In which we can offer a more articulate answer to the 
question referring to the “meaning” of human life and human existence. It has 
become clear and unambiguous that the meaning of man, the being called Dasein – 
as the actual possibility of being and the actual horizon of these possibilities of 
being – cannot be taken beyond question and questioning, therefore neither beyond 
the questioning being! Since without questioning there cannot exist or open up any 
kind of meaning or horizon of meaning outlined and articulated as an explicit and 
challenging possibility! 
 Questioning is exclusively the possibility, mode and ambition of being of a 
being whose relationship with the other beings, sending always back to itself is 
always also being-like. Which, while validating and conducting its own being in its 
own modes of being, must always experience the all-time weight of its being as 
well. Which is thus inquiringly and questioningly mortal, and as such, in the aspects 
and manners revealed here, historical and free in its being. So the meaning of 
human existence, with its temporal, spatial etc. diversity, lies in fact in the kind of 
freedom outlined here and the human finitude constituted by it, as well as in the 
human modes of being of this finitude; in other words, in the history constituted and 
conditioned by death and mortality! Human existence is therefore not at all 
“meaningless” or “absurd” or “tragicomical”! It is “only” questionable and 
inquiring, always as an ambition, expectation or challenge of being! And as such, 
always “in expectance” of itself – always outdistancing itself. Philosophy exists in 
fact essentially for the revelation and opening up of this. For which reason the 
particular duty or task of philosophy cannot be any kind of comforting or 
consolation. But only clarification, or the achievement and securing of all-time 
clarity. With the addition that clarification means here not the “clarification” of 
concepts – as word-things – but always precisely the increase of questionability; that 
is, it can “only” mean the continuous, all-time, actual and possible re-asking of 
questions, corresponding to their own weight.  
 However, it is not excluded at all that this clarification, if made possible, 
carried out and achieved, may bring both “calmness” and “ease”. Such that has 
nothing to do with the arbitrary and unquestioned, promising and/or threatening 
“piety” – which turns away from consistent inquiry and often even prosecutes it – of 
either illusory consolations or comfortable illusions. But only with the meaning of 
philosophy and life. More precisely: the question of meaning! Which philosophy 
repeatedly asks and in which – just like man himself – it repeatedly stands, and can 
only stand, with being-like inquiry and questionability… For, only because he 
dwells mortally, therefore does man dwell, and must dwell questioningly and 
historically in his freedom – that is, in being, bringing to life history itself as a new 
dimension of being.  
 
Translated by Emese Czintos 
